Iran "Buying Off" Shiite Indian Clerics

Friday, 04 May 2007, 11:42
C O N F I D E N T I A L


SUBJECT: IRAN MANIPULATING INDIAN ELITE OPINION-MAKERS
Classified By: Charge Geoffrey Pyatt

Summary
Details emerge of an overture from Tehran towards prominent Indians who are critical of warmer ties with America.
1. (C) This cable contains an action request for SCA. Please see paragraph 6.

New Iranian Mischief

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2. (C) Ambassador K.V. Rajan, former Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs and current Chairman of the Prime Minister's National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), called Charge May 4 for an urgent meeting in which he told Charge that he had been invited by the Iranian Embassy for an all expenses paid trip for "politicians, scholars and commentators." The list of invitees in a fax from the Iranian Embassy press section included notorious America-critics, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX. The visit was scheduled for April 28-May 4, and the Embassy said the guests would meet Iranian officials, scholars and would visit "one or two Iranian nuclear establishment(s)." Reports this week in the "Asian Age" and "The Hindu" indicate the group visited the Arak Heavy Water Complex and met with Minister of Energy Parviz Fatah.

3. (C) Rajan told Charge that this trip was part of an effort on the part of the Iranian government to encourage anti-American, pro-Muslim scholars and think-tankers in India to influence Prime Minister Singh's supporters to take a more pro-Iranian, anti-U.S. view, and that his presence on the delegation would have handed Iran a PR coup. In light of his suspicions, Rajan canceled at the last minute, citing a sudden family emergency. Following is the invitee list, which Rajan provided to Charge:

-- XXXXXXXXXXXX

India Seeks U.S. Help

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4. (C) To counter this new and worrying effort to reach out to Indian opinion makers, Rajan proposed a visit to the United States starting May 14 in his NSAB capacity for five to seven days to talk to officials, think tanks, and the intelligence community to discuss ways to understand better U.S. assessments of Iran. He would expect this to feed into NSAB discussion of Iran policy options.

5. (C) Rajan's analysis of Iranian intentions to influence PM Singh's domestic constituencies is deeply worrying and spot-on, and confirms what we have been reporting. Rajan also noted stepped up Iranian funding to sympathetic Shia clerics. The United Progressive Alliance government is deeply interested in appeasing its Muslim and Left Front

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supporters, and is concerned about the outcome of elections in Uttar Pradesh state, where a large number of Muslim constituents reside. We see evidence that Iran has been buying off journalists, clerics and editors in Shia-populated areas of Uttar Pradesh and Kashmir, doling out large sums to stoke anti-Americanism. Now, it seems Iran is focusing squarely on influential elite audiences in Delhi, with a view to shaping the debate of India's IAEA policy and the nuclear deal.

ACTION REQUEST: HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS

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6. (C) To counter this insidious new Iranian effort, we recommend Rajan receive meetings, if possible, with:

-- XXXXXXXXXXXX

Patriotic Indian Mulsims

Dated 02 December 2005, 12:54
C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: INDIA'S DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMY MINIMIZE EXTREMIST
RECRUITMENT OF JUVENILES (C-CT5-00623)

Summary
A briefing on India's 150 million Muslims - and why they prefer moderate, mainstream denominations of the faith. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
1. (C) India's over 150 million Muslim population is largely unattracted to extremism. India's growing economy, vibrant democracy, and inclusive culture, encourage Muslims to seek success and social mobility in the mainstream and reduces alienation. With Indian Muslim youth increasingly comfortable in the mainstream, the pool of potential recruits is shrinking, while Muslim families and communities provide little sanction or support to extremist appeals. This cable is in response to Reftel requesting information on methods used by extremist groups to recruit and train youths under the age of 18. Post notes that India is home to a wide variety of extremist groups, including religious extremists (Hindu, Muslim and Sikh), ethnic separatists, and extremists from the political left (Naxalites) and right (primarily Hindu fascists), all of whom recruit children. However, reftel requests information only on Islamic extremist groups such as Al-Qa'ida, Ansar al-Sunnah, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Taliban and Kashmiri militants, and we will confine our analysis to such groups.

The Muslim Minority

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2. (C) According to India's 1991 National Census, the Muslim population constitutes just under 15 percent of the country's total. It grew by 33 percent between 1981-2001, while the general population increased by 24 percent. Islam is India's largest minority religion. In many towns and cities, particularly in Northern India, one third or more of the population is Muslim. The largest concentrations of Muslims live in the states of Bihar (12 million), West Bengal (16 million), and Uttar Pradesh (24 million). The overwhelming majority (92 percent) are Sunnis, the remainder being Shias. India's Muslim population is estimated to be as large as 150 million (the second largest in the world after Indonesia), and suffers from higher rates of poverty than most other groups in India, and can be the victims of discrimination and prejudice. Despite this, the vast majority remain committed to the Indian state and seek to participate in mainstream political and economic life. Only a small number of young Muslims have concluded that mainstream politics will never address their grievances and have gravitated toward pan-Islamic and pro-Pakistan organizations, which sometimes engage in acts of violence. India's vibrant democracy, inclusive culture and growing economy have made it easier for Muslim youth to find a place in the mainstream, reduced the pool of potential recruits, and the space in which Islamic extremist organizations can operate.

A Vibrant Democracy

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3. (C) Although there are a wide variety of Islamic religious, political and social organizations, most Muslims join or support secular groups without a specific Islamic identity. The ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA), spearheaded by Congress, projects itself as the secular alternative to the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA), dominated by the Hindu-nationalist BJP. Muslims generally join secular parties as the best way to ensure that the BJP does not attain political power, although the BJP

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does have Muslim members as well. No exclusively Muslim organization has succeeded in mobilizing more than a small portion of the Muslim faithful. Muslim organizations that support terrorism against the Indian state and non-Muslim Indians are very small and lack influence or popular following outside of Kashmir. India's vibrant democracy has ensured that the large Muslim community has a voice in politics and recent elections have demonstrated that Muslim voters are courted actively by political parties. With a Muslim President (Abdul Kalam) occupying the highest political position in the country, Muslims have been encouraged to seek political power in electoral and parliamentary politics, all but eliminating the appeal of violent extremism.

Growing Economy

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4. (C) India's secular education system increasingly integrates Muslim students into the mainstream and has spawned a growing and prosperous Muslim middle class. Muslims, like Indians generally, rely on education and English language competence to provide access to increased job opportunities. In the past, extremist groups focused on Indian universities as potential recruiting grounds, but the economic upturn has transformed this dynamic. Most Muslims approaching graduation from University will be prepared to enter the job market and are not interested in extremism. This cuts down the time when Muslim students are vulnerable to extremist recruitment and compels extremist organizations to target younger students. Economic growth has spawned dramatic social change and Muslim extremists must find potential recruits who have not yet participated in or benefited from the economic boom, consumer capitalism and the attractions of the media. These groups are likely to reject any recruit who has already been enticed away from Islamic separatism into secular values.

And an Inclusive Culture

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5. (C) In order for Islamic extremism to be attractive to Indian Muslim youth, they would have to feel alienated from the mainstream culture. While Muslims are often victimized and discriminated against, traditional barriers to cultural integration are breaking down. Young and dynamic Muslims are popular culture heroes in sports (Sania Mirza) and Bollywood (Sharrukh Khan and many others). The message for young Muslims is that they are Indians first and Muslims second, and that they can fully participate in Indian society and culture and win the adulation and respect of other Indians, regardless of religion.

Kashmir - The Exception

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6. (C) Jammu and Kashmir, India's only Muslim majority state, is characterized by a different kind of political Islam. Kashmiri Muslims, like many of their counterparts throughout South Asia, have been historically heavily influenced by Sufi Islam, but because of their majority status and geographic isolation in a remote princely state, never saw themselves as part of the Islamic mainstream in pre-partition India. Kashmiri Muslims have worked actively to maintain a separate identity and have resisted

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integration. This has been compounded by the turbulence and terrorism that have engulfed the state since 1989. The Kashmiri sense of separateness permeates the programs and manifestos of Kashmir's Islamic groups, and Kashmiri Muslims have not embraced Indian Muslims' aspirations for national integration. Moreover, many Kashmiri Muslims have parted company with their Indian Muslim counterparts and embraced Wahhabi Islam during the insurgency. While Indian Muslims feel compelled to express support for their co-religionists in Kashmir, they tend to look upon Kashmiris with suspicion and try to keep the Kashmiri cause at arm's length.

The Extremists

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7. (C) Separatism and religious extremism have little appeal to Indian Muslims, and the overwhelming majority espouse moderate doctrines. While the conservative Sunni political organization the Jamaat Islami (JI) and the Deobandi sect espouse Islamic chauvinism, and some of their members express admiration for Osama bin Ladin, their leaders usually do not express such views in public, and there is little to indicate that they have provided anything more than rhetorical support to terrorists. Attacks by Hindu extremists on innocent Muslims and periodic bouts of bloody communal rioting, have led a small number of Muslims to cross the line from sympathizing with violence to engaging in terrorism. Some Kashmiri terrorist groups argue that only attacks outside of Kashmir will shake the Indian state and convince the GOI to withdraw. Members of these two small slivers of the Muslim community provide recruits for groups prone to acts of violence and terrorism, many of which are supported from outside India. The numbers are small, especially outside of Kashmir, but they remain capable of periodic bombings and other acts of violence.

8. (C) Indian Islamic groups that are extreme in their views and activities include

Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Marqazi-Jamiyat-e-Ahal-e-Hadith (MJAH) Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA) Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF) Muslim Liberation Army (MLA) Muslim Security Force (MSF) Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA)

9. (C) In addition, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) are Pakistan-based groups which recruit Indian Muslims. Hizbul Mujahideen is a Kashmiri terrorist group which works closely with the Pakistan-based organizations. The MJAH is a nationwide organization for Muslims who subscribe to Wahhabi Islam. Since the overwhelming majority of Indian Sunnis belong to the more liberal Barelvi and Deobandi schools, the Wahhabi sect has relatively few adherents, and only a small segment of Indian Wahabis endorse the MJAH and its views. The group is very small and press accounts have periodically linked it to bombings, most recently in Mumbai. SIMI was originally founded to provide spiritual guidance to Muslim university students, but drifted into extremist politics and terrorism, and was subsequently banned by the GOI in 2001. Individual

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SIMI members are periodically arrested and prosecuted, but the group is largely dormant. LeT and JeM have cells in India which have committed terrorist attacks, primarily in J & K, but elsewhere as well. The GOI has stated that the LeT is the principal suspect in the recent deadly bombings in Delhi, which killed over 70 persons. Most Indians, both Muslim and non-Muslim, view members of these groups as subversive agents of a hostile power, Pakistan.

Answers to Specific Questions

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10. (C) Question A -- Recruitment

As explained above, there are two distinct threads of Islamic extremism in India, which can overlap, but are largely separate; Kashmiri groups, which are both Islamic and ethnic, and non-Kashmiri groups, which emphasize a primarily religious identity while Kashmiri groups have recruited boys under the age of 18, other extremist groups have concentrated on University students, who are often above the age of 18. Kashmir has been embroiled in terrorism for decades, exposing children to violence at an early age. Decades of conflict, a high casualty rate, and war-weariness has shrunk the pool of recruits for Kashmiri terrorist groups and they have turned to younger boys.

11. (C) Most experts believe that terrorism in Kashmiri is now largely a non-Kashmiri affair. A study by a private think tank on recruitment into Indian terrorist organizations verified that Kashmiri terrorist groups are the only Islamic groups specifically to recruit juveniles. The report claims that children have participated in terrorist attacks in Kashmir since the early 1990s, when there were documented cases of juveniles throwing grenades at security force pickets. Inspector-General of Police K. Rajendra said in October 2003 that perhaps only a handful of children have been involved in actual incidents, that in 2002 the Kashmir police knew of the recruitment of approximately 100 child recruitments, and that the number increased to approximately 500 in 2003. According to the study, the terrorist groups have evolved a specific method of juvenile recruitment. A 'scout' or 'overground worker' surveys an area and identifies boys from poor families within the target age group. On a given day, the terrorists abduct the identified targets at gun-point and take them to a hideout. The groups target schools, as exemplified in July 2003, when a LeT recruiter walked into the playground of the National High School at the small Bandipora village of Vijhar in the Baramulla district. Security forces subsequently rescued a group of six children from the LeT 'scout.' Some of the rescued children had repeatedly failed school examinations and others had dropped out to take unpaid apprenticeships in dead-end jobs. Police assert that families are coerced to 'donate' a younger son to the 'jihad' and that refusal to comply could result in the death of the entire family. Since 2003, the border has become less porous, the appeal of joining terrorist groups has diminished, and there are fewer media accounts of child abductions and rescues.

12. (C) Some prominent instances demonstrating patterns of child recruitment include:

--On 6 August 2001, security forces intercepted three terrorists forcibly taking 12 young boys at gunpoint to

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Pakistan for training and induction into their ranks. As the young boys ran towards the security forces for safety, the terrorists fired on them killing one boy and injuring another, the security forces rescued the remainder.

--In July-August 2001, security forces rescued 39 young boys in the age group of 14-18, being taken at gun point to Pakistan for training.

--In 2003, an estimated 500 teenagers were recruited into various terrorist outfits in J&K. The child recruits received rudimentary arms training, but primarily worked as cooks, cleaners, porters and guides for terrorists

13. (C) Outside of Kashmir, Islamic organizations in Indian universities have some success recruiting Muslim students, many from rural backgrounds and away from home for the first time. Those who stay with such groups can become increasingly isolated from the mainstream and are attractive recruits for Islamic extremists. Our contacts tell us, however, that most Muslim students lose interest in such groups as they become more comfortable in their new environments. The Indian media has published colorful stories implying that Madrassas are recruiting centers for Islamic terrorism and that many are funded by Pakistan's ISI. The accounts are mostly anecdotal, however, and there has been little or no hard evidence linking Indian Madrassas to terrorist recruitment. Madrassas originally started at the secondary level and were confined to boys, with most Muslim children attending public primary schools in their own villages. The Deobandi sect is establishing a series of primary schools for North Indian boys and girls. Their goal is to provide madrassa education for children from age five through university level. There is some concern that this move could isolate children from the mainstream and make them more prone to extremism or susceptible to recruitment into terrorist groups.

question B -- Characteristics of Recruits

14. (C) Muslim contacts tell us that young recruits in Kashmir are those who have been brutalized by violence, lost loved ones, or have personally experienced repression by the Indian security forces. Many are bent on revenge. As in most war-torn areas, children brutalized by their environment can begin to see violence as a normal career path and can divorce it from any ideological justification. Non-Kashmiri recruits are said to be primarily from blue collar or poor families with limited education and from a rural or urban slum background. They can find higher education to be a painful process and have trouble adjusting to a radically different environment, and can embrace radical Islam as a coping mechanism, as the Islamic groups welcome them and provide them with a warm and familiar environment. In Gujarat and Western India, particularly in Mumbai, many Muslims were traumatized by anti-Muslim rioting following the destruction of Babri Mosque in 1992, and the Godhra train violence of 2002. We speculate that their principal motivation is revenge for senseless and painful attacks inflicted on them, their families, and their communities by Hindu extremists.

question C -- Juveniles and the Advancement of Terrorist Goals

15. (C) Kashmiri groups, facing a limited manpower pool and

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heavily outnumbered by the Indian security forces, have seen a harsh attrition as their members are killed, imprisoned, or fall away. Like terrorist groups in other countries facing a similar dilemma (the LTTE in Sri Lanka for example), they have recruited younger and younger members. In addition, Kashmiri adults have largely tired of violence and extremism and are less receptive to terrorist recruitment. In such an environment, children are more pliable and less resistant. They can also provide a lifetime of service, in a conflict that seems to go on without end. Other Islamic extremist groups have a similar dilemma, in that Islamic extremism is not popular in India and most adults are not interested. This forces extremists to pitch to young and naive audiences who may be more amenable.

question D -- Rehabilitation Methods

16. (C) Since there is relatively little recruitment of juveniles into extremist groups, especially outside of Kashmir, there is no GOI program aimed specifically at rehabilitating them. We know of no instances where child terrorists have been captured. In those instances where abducted children are rescued, the security forces return them to their parents.

question E -- Reasons why Extremists May Refrain from Juvenile Recruitment

17. (C) Kashmir has had the most experience with recruitment of juveniles into extremist groups. Enthusiasm there for the separatist/terrorist cause has largely waned, and the organizations there are concerned that they could become totally isolated and liable to be crushed by the security services if their popular support dries up. Cost benefit analysis would convince most such groups that the cost of losing support from the local community is too high for the small benefit provided by youthful recruits. Outside Kashmir, Muslims are facing the same pressures for social mobility as non-Muslims. Most Indian children are under pressure to get into school, stay in school, and perform well there, in order to obtain higher education and access to well-paid jobs. Attempts by extremist groups to recruit children from Muslim homes are likely to run into a wall of opposition from parents who would see involvement in extremism as counterproductive and a threat to future success of their children. This means that extremism is most attractive to children from families that are so poor that opportunities for education and advancement are all but non-existent. As the Indian economy continues to boom, the percentage of Muslim families who feel there is no hope for their children's' future is growing smaller, as is the pool of potential recruits. MULFORD

India a 'raucous democracy' but 'true partner' of America

Thursday, 11 February 2010, 13:07
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000287
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, ECON, SENV, AF, PK, IN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL KERRY'S VISIT TO INDIA
Classified By: A/DCM Uzra Zeya. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).

Summary
In a wideranging brief before a visit by Senator John Kerry, US diplomats praise India's "raucous democracy" and Manmohan Singh's government and welcome new recognition of Indian responsibilites on climate change. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
1. (S) Summary: You will find an Indian government that is more committed than ever to building a durable and wide ranging USG-GOI relationship after Prime Minister Singh's Washington visit in November. New Delhi has been broadly supportive of USG goals in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. After refusing post-Mumbai to engage broadly with Pakistan until Islamabad took action against the attack perpetrators, New Delhi has now offered unconditional talks to Islamabad. This is a calculated risk on PM Singh's part given the political fallout over last summer's India-Pakistan joint statement at Sharm al Sheikh. On Afghanistan, there are underlying concerns that U.S. policy foreshadows an early exit from Afghanistan with negative security consequences for India. India has expressed concern about the outlines of the reintegration policy promoted by the Karzai government and supported by the United States. The GOI has begun to weigh a policy response that may include increased Afghan police and military training/assistance. They will be interested in your views on India's role in Afghanistan. Our bilateral Civil-Nuclear Agreement no longer dominates the headlines, but the goodwill it generated has contributed to our improved relationship across the board and to India's gradual movement toward the nonproliferation mainstream. Several Agreement implementation measures remain unresolved. The U.S.-India defense relationship is progressing rapidly, and defense sales could reach USD 4 billion in 2011. The U.S.-India economic relationship, for decades practically nonexistent, has grown quickly and U.S. exports to India have increased five-fold from USD 3.6 billion in 2000 to USD 17.7 billion last year. On climate change, the Copenhagen conference marked a fundamental shift in India's position, and India is beginning to understand it must address the climate issue not as a poor developing nation but rather as the major economy it has become. End Summary.

Pakistan

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2. (S) The Indians understand our message about the importance of resuming a robust dialogue with Pakistan and the necessity of increased GOI communication to reassure Pakistani officials about India's intentions in Afghanistan. India has now offered to hold Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan, but has rejected Islamabad's attempts to condition resumption of discussion on picking up the thread from the Composite Dialogue India paused after Mumbai.

3. (C) PM Singh is taking a calculated political risk in pushing forward with an offer of talks with Pakistan. While there is a general recognition that the policy of not engaging with Pakistan except on counterterrorism issues has exhausted its usefulness, that does not necessarily translate into strong or consistent support for broad talks with Pakistan among the political class, given continuing terrorist threats. There are heavyweights in the Congress, including Finance Minister Mukherjee, who were not supportive after last year's Sharm al Sheikh Joint Statement fiasco, and they will seize on any missteps to argue against a policy that reaches out to the Pakistanis. This is also likely to be the last time for some time that PM Singh will have sufficient support to reach out to re-engage on dialogue. The PM took a beating after Sharm al Sheikh and his government's post-election honeymoon came to a crashing halt. If this renewed effort falters because of lack of interest on the part of the Pakistanis, many could point to newly appointed NSA Shiv Shankar Menon as the scapegoat. Menon was lambasted for his role as Foreign Secretary at Sharm and will equally be identified with this proposal.

Afghanistan

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4. (C) The reaction to the President's December 1 West Point speech announcing the way forward on Afghanistan drew guardedly positive support from most of our interlocutors. While the President's emphasis on development and agriculture assistance and a re-affirmation of USG commitment to the region drew approval, many were apprehensive about the setting of July 2011 as a beginning date for the transfer of U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. India's fears that its views and interests are not being taken into account has intensified lately: India was kept out of the Istanbul regional conference on Afghanistan (based on a Pakistani veto) and New Delhi was the odd man out at the London Conference over reintegration.

5. (U) India is proud of its own ongoing "development partnership" with post-Taliban Afghanistan that began in late 2001, and the GOI claims the sum of its performed and pledged assistance to date totals USD 1.3 billion. Civilian aid is channeled into three main areas: infrastructure development (centerpiece is a 218km road in Helmand); capacity building (scholarships and civil service training in India); and humanitarian assistance (daily food aid to 2 million Afghan school children). Virtually all GOI aid is administered through the Afghan government or NGOs.

6. (S) Indian support for Afghanistan's government is long-standing and motivated by a variety of reasons, not the least being Afghanistan's strategic value as New Delhi seeks regional influence. India, with the exception of the Taliban era, has always had strong ties to Afghanistan since Partition; conversely, Islamabad with the exception of the Taliban period, has had strained ties with Kabul. Pakistan's expectation that the government in Afghanistan will be pro-Pakistan and anti-Indian is unrealistic, particularly given Karzai's own long-standing ties to India and the goodwill that India's assistance and other elements of India's soft power have created in Afghanistan.

7. (S) While India's assistance to Afghanistan has primarily focused on reconstruction and stabilization, there has also been limited military aid. The MEA told us after the West Point speech that the GOI wishes to do more to help develop Afghan capacity, especially with regard to the police and military, but is also cognizant of USG "sensitivities" about such assistance. XXXXXXXXXXXX

Internal Politics: a Raucous Democracy

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8. (SBU) We have a true partner in the current Indian government led by Prime Minister Singh, but its capabilities are not without limits. The strong performance by the Congress Party and its United Progressive Alliance (UPA) allies in India's national elections in 2009 gave the Prime Minister Singh's coalition a mandate to govern and -- freed from dependence on half-hearted allies on the Left -- to promote a closer relationship with the United States. Despite the strong endorsement by the electorate and a floundering opposition, the UPA government has gotten off the blocks somewhat slowly. The government grew less confident after its honeymoon period was cut short by the fallout over a joint statement from Singh's July 2009 Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani. The Sharm debacle rallied Singh's otherwise disjointed political opponents, while reminding the Prime Minister of his constraints despite his mandate. The tentativeness of the government was again on display during the winter session of Parliament, during which an unruly opposition united over populist causes and sidelined civil nuclear liability legislation and long-awaited financial sector liberalization. The government is again on the defensive over demands for the creation of a separate state of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh. On February 3 it bowed to political pressure and announced the formation of a five-person Committee to evaluate the issue.

Civil Nuclear Cooperation

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9. (SBU) India viewed the signing of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as an historic event and an essential part of transforming our relationship. India has since followed through on its nonproliferation commitments by signing its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and concluding an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. We are working with the government to implement commercial cooperation, providing U.S. firms access to an estimated USD 150 billion market and leading to the creation of thousands of high-skilled jobs, as well as providing India's growing economy with access to clean energy. The Agreement no longer dominates the headlines, but the goodwill it generated has contributed to our improved relationship across the board and to India's gradual movement toward the nonproliferation mainstream.

10. (SBU) The Indian government made substantial progress on implementing commercial cooperation ahead of PM Singh's visit to Washington, though some important hurdles remain. In recent months, India announced two favorable reactor park sites for U.S. firms in the states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, and submitted its declaration of safeguarded facilities to the IAEA. We have held five rounds of reprocessing consultations pursuant to the 123 Agreement, and hope to conclude negotiations soon. The government responded to our request for Part 810 license assurances on the eve of Singh's visit, a top priority of U.S. industry, and we await clarification on two issues. The cabinet approved draft liability legislation, a top priority for U.S. firms, but Parliament was not able to pass the legislation in the just-concluded session.

The Defense Relationship

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11. (SBU) The U.S.-India defense relationship has progressed rapidly since sanctions were removed in 2000 following India's 1998 nuclear test. Today's relationship is focused on bilateral exercises, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), and personal exchanges at schools, conferences and seminars. Billion-dollar defense sales are a growing component and a superb opportunity to expand the relationship. Exercises are the most visible of the activities between our two militaries. In October, the Army completed its most ambitious exercise with the deployment of 17 Strykers to India for a two week exercise which included live firing of a combined mechanized task force for the first time. Simultaneously, the Air Force had five transport aircraft participating in exercise COPE INDIA held in Agra that included a Special Forces component. The Navy conducts an annual exercise, Malabar, that has been conducted both bilaterally and multilaterally. The Marines hold an annual exercise with the Indian Army, Shatrujeet, which focuses on amphibious operations. The Indians have been cooperating with the Joint POW/MIA Accountability Command for recovery of remains from downed Second World War planes in the politically sensitive state of Arunachal Pradesh. To date, we are still working on obtaining permission to repatriate all of the remains so as to properly identify and recover lost Airmen.

12. (SBU) Defense sales are growing quickly from roughly one billion USD in 2008, to over two billion so far this year. There is good potential for over four billion in sales next year, especially with the recent Ministry of Defense approval to pursue the C-17. For the first time, India can afford (politically and financially) to purchase front line U.S. equipment. They recognize the quality of U.S. systems and have been astounded by the mission capable rates quoted for U.S. aircraft compared to their older Russian inventory. They are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their analysis of costs and now use life-cycle cost instead of cost on delivery for some purchases, giving U.S. products an opportunity to beat cheaply made competitors. Most important, the July 2009 agreement on End Use Monitoring (EUM) has opened the door for FMS sales at a time when there is growing frustration with Russia - previously India's supplier of choice. The near doubling in cost and extensive delays in delivery of the ex-Russian aircraft carrier GORSHKOV, issues with transfer of technology on the T-90 tank, and universal problems with spare parts have convinced the GOI that new sources of supply are needed to balance Russia. Given an opportunity, we ask that you endorse Indian purchases of U.S. equipment as an important part of our defense relationship and support our ongoing sales efforts.

Economic Ties

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13. (SBU) The U.S.-India economic relationship, for decades practically nonexistent, has grown rapidly and has significant potential to expand further. At the same time, India is an increasingly important player at the table in multilateral economic fora, from the WTO Doha Round negotiations and the G-20, World Bank and IMF to the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen. While India was seen in the United States as a spoiler when the World Trade Organization Doha Development Agenda talks broke down in July 2008, India's new Commerce Minister showed leadership and significantly improved the tone of discussions when he hosted a Doha "Mini-ministerial" meeting in September, attended by U.S. Trade Representative Kirk.

14. (U) The United States is India's largest trading partner in goods and services and one of its largest foreign investors. Investment has surged between our countries in recent years, prompting agreement to launch negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty. U.S. exports to India has increased five-fold from USD 3.6 billion in 2000 to USD 17.7 billion last year. Two-way merchandise trade grew to a record USD 44.4 billion in 2008, a 76-percent increase from 2005. Reflecting the global economic downturn, exports to India fell 9.7 percent in January-September 2009 (to USD 8 billion), but Indian exports to the United States fell more sharply. Thus, the U.S. trade deficit with India fell 43.8 percent to just USD 3.2 billion in January-September 2009. Despite the size of its economy, India was only the United States' 18th largest trading partner in 2008. One of the major goals of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum is to resolve barriers to trade and investment to improve this ranking.

15. (U) India was somewhat shielded from the global economic downturn due to its conservative central bank and SEC-equivalent restricting many of the derivative innovations linked to the global financial crisis, and its relatively low reliance on exports. However, although India's "Wall Street" was less affected, its "Main Street" bore the brunt of the downturn, with slower growth, tighter access to credit, declining exports, higher unemployment, and less investment. In response, India's central bank and SEC-equivalent relaxed many of its restrictions on foreign capital inflows and investment procedures and the GOI enacted several fiscal stimulus programs, both pre- and post-election, to boost economic growth.

16. (SBU) The Indian economy continues to be one of fastest growing economies in the world, even as the global slowdown and financial crunch moderated GDP growth from nine percent in fiscal year (FY) 2007-08 to 6.7 percent in FY 2008-09, which ended March 31. Growth in the second quarter was 7.9 percent and growth in fiscal year 2009-10 is now expected to be in the seven percent range. The Commerce Ministry announced December 15 that it expects to see a return to positive export growth soon. With the expected return of higher growth rates, rising inflation, and the highest fiscal deficit (approximately 11 percent of GDP) in 20 years, the GOI has begun to reverse some the measures it enacted during the financial crisis and has announced plans to decrease subsidies and increase disinvestment. Lagging agricultural productivity and poor -- but improving -- infrastructure continue to constrain growth. Accordingly, the top Indian economic priorities remain physical and human infrastructure development and spreading economic benefits into rural India.

17. (U) The United States continues to have concerns about agricultural trade with India. The recently released Senate Finance Committee Report on Indian agricultural trade barriers -- a U.S. ITC investigation -- highlighted the essentially defensive agricultural trade policy long promoted by the Indian government. The United States is particularly interested in gaining marketing access for U.S. dairy products which are blocked due to a series of non-scientific GOI rules. Discussions are ongoing, but the effort to resolve long-standing agricultural trade issues is a Mission priority.

Climate Change/Clean Energy

---------------------------

18. (SBU) The 16th Conference of Parties (COP-16) at Copenhagen marked a fundamental shift in India's climate change position. Minister of Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh claimed victory for India's negotiating team in a December 22 address to parliament stating India was "entirely successful" at COP-16 in that there was no dilution of either the Bali Action Plan or the Kyoto Protocol, India was not required to agree on a peak year for its emissions, and that it avoided any legally binding emission commitments, including a long-term global goal of reducing emissions 50 percent by 2050. Although India's current position is that the Kyoto Protocol and Bali Action Plan are sacrosanct and must be the basis for all future climate negotiations, both Ramesh and Prime Minister Singh have publicly supported the Copenhagen Accord pursuant to the Accord, India communicated its domestic mitigation action of reducing it's carbon intensity by 20 to 25 percent by 2020 from a 2005 baseline to the UNFCCC Secretariat on January 30. In addition, Ramesh has drawn India farther from the G77 by telling parliament India was not in the same category as other developing countries such as Bangladesh, Maldives, Grenada, or African nations, that it did not need to demand technology transfer at low or no cost, and that India should be selling green technology to the world. India's association and close coordination of its climate negotiating position with the Basic Group of nations, comprised of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, indicates India is beginning to understand it must address the climate issue not as a poor developing nation but rather as the major economy it has become.

19. (SBU) During the November visit of the Prime Minister, Secretary Clinton and her Idian counterpart signed an MOU to Enhance Cooperation on Energy Security, Energy Efficiency, Clean Energy and Climate Change. Both countries share an interest in rapid expansion of clean and renewable energy production. India has massive investments planned in energy production, both conventional and renewable, as the government recognizes the need to continue to power India's economic growth and extend access to electricity to ever more of the significant portion of the population which still does not have it. The bilateral MOU calls for stepped up engagement beyond the existing Energy Dialogues to include a focused Clean Energy Research and Deployment Initiative to rapidly disseminate clean energy technologies, including solar, wind, hydro, as well as shale gas and cleaner coal. The USG is holding ongoing inter-agency consultations and is finalizing recommendations for the organization of these new initiatives. DOE has the lead on a Joint Clean Energy Research Center, while USAID is heading a multi-agency team to create the Clean Energy Deployment Center in coordination with State, Commerce, OPIC, EXIM, USTDA and others. Completed designs for the centers are expected by early spring. We expect that they will accelerate existing initiatives as well as launch numerous others in order to have broad impact in building the Indian clean energy market. ROEMER

JIHADI BIO TERRORISM

DATED: Wednesday, 24 May 2006, 10:28
SENSITIVITY: S E C R E T


SUBJECT: EMBASSY AND MEA HOLD PRODUCTIVE, FOCUSED CTJWG
FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN DELHI
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3473 B. NEW DELHI 3057 C. 05 NEW DELHI 6596

Summary: The DCM and key Embassy interlocutors on counterterrorism issues (see Paras 21-22) on May 19 reviewed with MEA Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh action items that emerged from the April 19 US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) meeting in Washington and subsequent CT-related conversations (Refs A and B). The dialogue paved the way for further discussions on bio-terrorism cooperation, operationalizing countering terrorism finance, aviation security, improving USG delivery of CT training (and a GOI offer to provide CT training to USG personnel), improving the sharing of GOI tactical terrorist threat information, and continuing the discussion on how most effectively to counter extremist ideology in mass media and on the Internet. Ambassador Singh and Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat) Sharad Kumar also shared GOI concerns that India is becoming more central to al-Qai'da's agenda, and that al-Qa'ida and "al-Qa'ida franchises" share close links with the Pakistan establishment. The Indians again were receptive to the idea of a focused effort to defeat LTTE fund-raising and arms trafficking, but asked that this be couched in generic terms, rather than targeting Sri Lanka alone. End Summary.

India Now an al-Qa'ida Target

-----------------------------

3. (C) Singh opened by noting that India is becoming more prominent on al-Qai'da's radar, pointing to Ayman al-Zawahiri's April 29 video message praising "popular jihadist movements against Indians in Kashmir" and calling India "the best candidate for carrying out the Zionist-Crusader scheme to humiliate, weaken, and dismember Pakistan." He added that al-Zawahiri's recent reference to the US-India civil nuclear agreement demonstrated that Delhi's growing cooperation with Washington was drawing al-Qai'da's attention.

Alleging Direct Links Between al-Qa'ida and Islamabad

--------------------------------------------- --------

4. (S) Singh asserted that Pakistan's ISI retains connections to al-Qa'ida and has been privy to Usama bin Ladin's communications. To the DCM's question of information on operational links, Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat, i.e. RAW) Sharad Kumar stated that Indian intelligence has transcripts of pre-9/11 meetings between UBL and Mullah Omar during which terrorism in J&K was discussed. He continued that UBL had been "willing to divert $20 million" from Central Asian programming to support Kashmir-oriented

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terrorism, and that UBL was quoted saying the Kashmiri jihadis "would not run short of funds." Kumar added that when UBL sent his bodyguard contingent to help the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance, the temporary chief of his security force was an unnamed individual who went on to join Jaish-e-Mohammad. Singh ascribed al-Qa'ida's increasing interest in India to the July 18 civil nuclear agreement. "ISI seeks to heat things up" to interfere with growing US-India convergence, he claimed.

5. (S) RAW's Kumar observed that today, "al-Qa'ida franchises," if not al-Qa'ida proper, are and have been very active in India. He defined "al-Qa'ida franchises" as groups that espouse the same extremist ideology and share some logistical and funding infrastructure even while remaining discrete organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Not all these groups or their attacks are linked, he continued; each must be investigated individually to locate their intersections.

Delhi Interest in Bio-Terror Rising

-----------------------------------

6. (C) Turning to the subject of counter-bio-terrorism cooperation, Singh reported that Indian intelligence is picking up chatter indicating jihadi groups are interested in bio-terrorism, for example seeking out like-minded PhD's in biology and bio-technology. He compared the prospects for nuclear terrorism ("still in the realm of the imaginary") to bio-terrorism ("an ideal weapon for terrorism ... anthrax could pose a serious problem ...it is no longer an academic exercise for us.") and indicated conceptual support for a joint bio-terrorism exercise. Singh stated that the text of the 1997 HHS/Ministry of Health Joint Statement included provisions for modeling bio-terrorism attacks, which could be used as a mechanism to support a joint exercise. (NOTE: Embassy HHS Attache reviewed the 1997 and 2005 HHS/MoH agreements and found no such mention of modeling bio-terrorism. End Note.) He concluded that although other relevant Ministries "work at their own pace," MEA would confer with them to secure their buy-in. Embassy will pursue the matter with MEA and other GOI interlocutors with an eye to conducting a joint and multi-agency bio-terrorism tabletop exercise by late 2006.

Operationalizing Anti-Terrorism Finance

---------------------------------------

7. (C) Noting that both sides have identical interests in combating terrorist groups but no practical experience in joint operations with each other, the DCM revisited the suggestion to create a contact group of experts -- with the MEA as the hub but including the Indian Finance Ministry and the nascent Financial Intelligence Unit as well as the Embassy Economics Section -- to focus on squeezing LTTE finances (Refs A and B). The DCM and Singh agreed that to keep the operation out of the spotlight it could adopt an innocuous name such as the "Subgroup on Terror Finance."

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PolCouns underscored the importance of moving from exchanging data on terrorist finances to shutting down money flows, particularly in light of the LTTE's wealth (i.e. it's ability to fund both a navy and an air force) and its recent egregiously violent attacks. J/S Kumar was tasked to develop ideas about modalities of the group's operations; he observed that although a cooperative effort is the most effective way forward, "most of our people are cagey regarding cooperation and joint operations," and "do not even trust others in their own government"; however, he added, their buy-in will be required. The DCM reassured Kumar that these operations would be kept in secure channels and well away from the media. Please see Action Request in Para 17.

Aviation Security

-----------------

8. (C) Taking note of the increase in aviation links between the US and India under the Open Skies agreement, including twice-daily non-stop flights, the DCM requested an official briefing on the GOI's anti-hijacking policy (Ref C) -- specifically, a full briefing to relevant Embassy elements (RSO, ECON, POL, etc.) plus advice on how Embassy can best brief US airlines on how they are affected by the GOI policy. Singh agreed to arrange the briefing. RSO added that Continental particularly had asked the Civil Aviation Ministry for this information but was only informed of the existence of a policy (and not the elements of that policy). (NOTE: A GOI Civil Aviation representative was slated to brief the CTJWG but was unable to travel to Washington to attend the meeting. End Note.) Before turning to a broader review of CT training opportunities, RSO noted that, pending a June 1 approval deadline, a DS/ATA Airport Security Consultation is slated for June 26-30.

Making CT Training Smarter

--------------------------

9. (C) After RSO provided an update on ATA courses for India currently in the pipeline (Para 18), Singh passed to the DCM a GOI "wish-list" of ATA courses (Para 19) and a list of courses the GOI could offer to USG law enforcement/military officers (Para 20). RSO pointed out that the Airport Security Consultation could be used to bootstrap other related training, such as on travel document authentication.

10. (C) Moving forward, RSO asked for points of contact among GOI subject-matter experts to identify course objectives ahead of time, to allow USG training providers to modify courses (where possible) to meet GOI objectives. RSO noted the broad spectrum of USG elements that would benefit by having this information.

India "Can't Afford to Lag Behind" on Bio-Metrics

--------------------------------------------- ----

11. (C) Singh raised the issue of bio-metrics cooperation, in which the GOI "can't afford to lag behind," he said. The

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MEA's Consular/Passports/Visas Division coordinates with the Home Ministry in this area. He underlined the role of document authentication in disrupting terrorist (and other illicit) travel and the transit of weapons and other contraband shipments. Singh and the DCM agreed on the importance of harmonizing document standards. The DCM reminded Singh that one problem the USG has in repatriating Indian nationals is the difficulty in verifying their identities; the Embassy's Consular Section works with the Home Ministry but bio-metrics may offer a solution.

Streamlining Flow of Tactical Threat Information

--------------------------------------------- ---

12. (C) The DCM underlined the importance of the Embassy (through the RSO) being able promptly to inform US businesses with equities in India of "the ground truth" on terrorist threat information and terrorist attacks, including hoaxes. Stories periodically appear in the Indian press that sensationalize alleged threats against American interests. While these stories are often based on faulty information, they do serve to increase security concerns in the American corporate community in particular. The DCM explained the USG "No Double Standard" and offered that GOI sources and methods could still be protected under that policy. When Singh asked how such incidents are handled in Washington, RSO informed him the DS Protective Liaison Division keeps close contact with the diplomatic community. One DS Agent typically services several diplomatic missions -- and is able to share tactical terrorist threat information on a real-time basis. Singh concurred that such a service in India is necessary beyond what state police agencies may provide, and suggested the MEA, with inputs from the state police and Home Ministry, would be the likely information provider. The DCM then explained the function of the Embassy's EAC to evaluate imminent threat information and decide on an appropriate response, indicating how reliable real-time GOI terrorist threat information would fit into the Embassy's decision-making process. Singh agreed in principle to create a real-time response mechanism to disseminate GOI terrorist threat information, with RSO as the Embassy's POC. He saw this as important both to the diplomatic community and India's growing pool of expatriate businesses.

"No Complaints" on Intel Sharing

--------------------------------

13. (S) Singh reported that there were "no complaints" from Delhi on US-India intelligence sharing overall, and introduced J/S Kumar as a key contact for intel sharing. The DCM concurred n the positive state of intelligence cooperation. He conveyed his understanding that earlier US concerns in this area have largely been resolved.

Continuing the Ideological Discussion

-------------------------------------

14. (S) The DCM and Singh revisited the CTJWG discussion on

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combating extremist ideology particularly through the Internet without leaving a USG fingerprint. They agreed to schedule separate meetings to pursue this issue and explore how much can be accomplished and how best to do so.

Future Meetings Planned

-----------------------

15. (C) In addition to issue-specific Embassy-GOI meetings to be held over the summer, Singh said that he planned to meet S/CT Ambassador Crumpton in September on the fringes of the UNGA. The DCM noted that Undersecretary Nick Burns plans to visit India in late summer, which would offer an interim opportunity to review CT progress, among other issues.

Comment: Encouraging Signs Continue

-----------------------------------

16. (C) We are encouraged by the MEA's continued receptivity to engage with us more deeply than in recent history on CT issues. Barriers appear to be dissolving even regarding very sensitive issues, such as intelligence sharing and bio-terrorism preparedness. As far as the US-India CT dialogue is concerned, Ambassador Singh embodies the adage that "the right man in the right place at the right time can turn the tide." He has yet to ensure the other actionable parts of the Indian bureaucracy march in the same direction and to the same tune, but it is clear he is serious about making practical CT cooperation work and serious about working with us to do so.

Action Request for SCA and S/CT

-------------------------------

17. (C) Given the GOI's expressed interest in "doing more" on the LTTE (Refs A and B and Para 7), Embassy requests further guidance from SCA and S/CT on moving in coordination with Delhi against LTTE finances and arms flows. We expect also to be queried about what steps the USG is prepared to take against LTTE fund-raising in the US.

ATA Courses In Train for India 2006

-----------------------------------

18. (SBU) Begin list of ATA courses for India 2006:

-- ATA-5345 Executive Course on Cyber-Terrorism Duration: June 12-14 Location: Hyderabad Status: Offer accepted

-- ATA-2994 Post-Blast Investigation Duration: July 17-August 4 Location: Baton Rouge Status: Offer accepted

-- ATA-5062 India Senior Crisis Management Course Duration: August 21-26

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Location: Washington Status: Pending GOI approval

-- ATA-5956 Airport Security Consultation Duration: June 26-30 Location: New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Jaipur Status: Requested by the GOI. Pending formal approval

-- ATA-5737 India VIP Protection Course Duration: August 7-25 Location: Baton Rouge Status: Pending GOI approval

GOI "Wish List" for CT Courses

---------------------------------

19. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document "ATA Training Courses - Requirements of Indian Police:

Methodology and equipment for countering suicide bombing and fidayeen attacks.

Countermeasures against improvised explosive devices and land mines used against transport vehicles

Terrorist communications systems

Channels of terrorist financing - Modus Operandi and countermeasures

Building personal profile of terrorists/criminals: How to build the profile (including modus operandi) of terrorists and criminals associated with organized crime

Database development: -- What databases are available to investigators in the US? -- How have these databases been built/developed? -- What are the laws associated with the creation and access to these databases?

Experience Sharing: The most valuable input to agencies charged with the task of maintaining security is the experience of other such agencies. At the moment US security forces are dealing with "rural" militancy in Afghanistan and "urban" militancy in Iraq. It is not necessary to send a large number of officers from India. US officers with appropriate experience could come to India for 2-3 day sessions with Indian officers. This idea is an extension of the cooperation between the defense forces of the two countries. We would thus suggest the following:

Experience Sharing/Afghanistan: -- What were the problems faced in Afghanistan at the strategic level; at the tactical level? -- What strategies evolved to resolve the problems? -- How successful were the strategies and what were/are the problems faced in implementing the strategies? -- What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the

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security forces? -- In retrospect, what else could have been done?

Experience Sharing/Iraq: -- What were the problems faced in Iraq at the strategic level; at the tactical level? -- What strategies evolved to resolve the problems? -- How successful were the strategies and what were/are the problems faced in implementing the strategies? -- What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the security forces? -- In retrospect, what else could have been done?

General policing as related to terrorism: -- Forged documentation and travel documents -- Money counterfeiting -- Money laundering

Security Management: -- Airport security -- VIP protection

Intelligence gathering techniques including practical demonstration of the techniques

Illegal immigration management including border patrolling techniques

Forensics medicine: new methodology and tools available to assist investigations

Forensic science: -- DNA fingerprinting -- Other special techniques such as use of polygraph -- Use of voice prints and other biometric measures

End Text.

GOI Offer of CT Courses for USG Personnel

-----------------------------------------

20. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document "Counterterrorism Courses for US Forces Personnel in India":

-- Money Laundering at CBI Academy, Ghaziabad

-- Counter-Insurgency and Commando Course at Border Security Forces Training Center & School, Hazaribagh.

-- Weapons & Tactics Course at Central School of Weapons and Tactics, BSF Training Center & School, Indore.

-- Bomb Disposal Course at NSG Training Center, Manesar. (NOTE: NSG is the National Security Group, whose mandate includes VIP protection and response to major acts of terrorism occurring at diplomatic and GOI facilities. End Note.)

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-- Young Officer-Leg. II (Integrated) Course at BSF Academy, Tekanpur

-- Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare Course at Assam Rifles Training Center & School, Dimphu (Nagaland)

-- Training at Greyhounds Regional Training Center, Hyderabad (NOTE: The Greyhounds is a GOI security force targeting India's Naxalites/Maoists. End Note.)

End Text.

--------------

The Enigma of Sonia Gandhi's Personality(2)

Tuesday, 06 November 2007, 13:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004881

SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE, GUJARAT ELECTIONS KEY TO GOI
APPROACH ON US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL


Summary
A landmark US-India nuclear pact is put to the test in the crucible of Indian domestic politics. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
1. (C) Summary: The upcoming winter session of Parliament in mid-November and Gujarat state assembly elections in mid-December will play a key role in shaping GOI actions on the US-India civil nuclear agreement. The respective positions of the Congress Party and the Left parties are likely to be fine-tuned in a series of inter-party and intra-party meetings in the days before Parliament begins debate on the agreement on or around November 19. The debate will be unpredictable but vigorous, with a great deal of high rhetoric and low tactics by all the parties. If the UPA emerges from the debate with no clear "sense of the House" against the deal, it will look for opportunities to move forward on discussions with the IAEA. Most observers believe that the Gujarat elections in mid-December will provide the true test of UPA government's approach on the agreement. If the Congress Party puts in a good performance in this BJP stronghold, it might feel politically strong enough to challenge the Left parties by moving forward with the IAEA on the safeguards agreement at the risk of (or even the desire for) early mid-term polls. However, Mrs. Gandhi never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity to show real leadership. While remaining publicly restrained and taking care not to be seen as interfering with domestic Indian politics, the Embassy will continue to meet with all political, business and civil society parties and interest groups to urge them to support the agreement. End Summary.

Timetable Ahead of Parliamentary Debate

---------------------------------------

2. (U) With the first few days of the session devoted to housekeeping matters, Parliament is expected to take up serious business on November 19. This date is significant for Parliamentary debate on the US-India civil nuclear initiative because it follows closely four other meetings:

-- November 11-12: Meeting of Communist Party - Marxist politburo meeting;

-- November 16: Meeting of the UPA-Left coordination committee on the US-India civil nuclear agreement, unless that meeting is postponed;

-- November 16: Meeting of the Congress Working Committee, the highest decision-making body of the Congress Party; and

-- November 17: Meeting of the All India Congress Committee, the broadest and most representative body of the Congress Party.

Avoiding Monsoon Session Gridlock

---------------------------------

3. (C) The discussion and decisions taken at these meetings will feed directly into the Parliamentary debate that follows. In the monsoon session in August, boisterous disruptions by the Left parties and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) over the nuclear initiative paralyzed Parliamentary business. The UPA government is hoping to avoid a similar scene during the winter session because the principal players appear to have recently pulled back somewhat from the confrontational approach they held in August-October.

Positive Developments: Left Parties

-----------------------------------

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4. (C) The US-India civil nuclear initiative still faces an uphill road (Ref G) but there have been developments in recent days that bode well for the government, if not for quick completion of the nuclear deal. The Left parties, while continuing to reiterate their firm opposition to the civil nuclear agreement, have gone out of their way to reject the notion of early parliamentary elections. "There is no threat to the UPA government," Communist Party Marxist General Secretary Prakash Karat told reporters on October 30. Some see this as a glimmer of hope that the Left may not force the collapse of the UPA government if the Prime Minister moves forward on the IAEA safeguards agreement. This is reassuring to UPA allies such as Railway Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav of the Rashtriya Janata Dal, Sharad Pawar of the Nationalist Congress Party and Karunanidhi of the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham, all of whom, deathly afraid of early elections, pressured the UPA government to slow down progress on the agreement. The Left parties have also taken pains recently to be conciliatory towards the Prime Minister and his stand on the US-India agreement after having attacked him sharply during the last two months.

Positive Developments: BJP

--------------------------

5. (C) The BJP, while it continues to speak with many conflicting voices, appears to have softened its opposition to the agreement, in part, due to the Ambassador's meetings with BJP leaders (Ref A, D, E). A party spokesman said on October 30 that the BJP will not insist, as it did during the monsoon session, that debate on the agreement be conducted under Parliamentary rules that require a vote, something the UPA government had refused to do. The BJP spokesman also noted that his party will drop its monsoon session demand for the establishment of a joint parliamentary committee to examine the agreement. Perhaps the most important BJP pronouncement on the issue was made by Leader of the Opposition L.K. Advani, who supported the call for a full Parliamentary debate but pointed out that the government is not constitutionally bound to accept the opinion of Parliament on this issue, rebuffing Karat's shrill insistence on an enhanced, more formal role for Parliament in Indian foreign policy formulation. .

Positive Developments: Congress

-------------------------------

6. (C) Since the October 12 reversal by Sonia Gandhi and the Prime Minister on the US-India agreement (Ref L), the Congress Party appears to be stiffening its back a little. The Prime Minister and the party have acknowledged a "delay in operationalizing" the agreement but have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to finalizing the deal. The Prime Minister made this observation after his October 30 meeting with German Chancellor Merkel. He assured Treasury Secretary Paulson on October 29 that the government was fully

SIPDIS committed to the agreement (Ref B) and were exploring various ways of getting it through the domestic obstacles. Speaking at a November 5 conference, he called critics of the nuclear initiative "myopic."

Unpredictable Debate

--------------------

7. (C) It is difficult to foretell how the Parliamentary debate over the agreement will turn out. The Left has been assiduously courting regional parties in recent days and several of these parties have expressed solidarity with the Left's position. Yet, the regional parties do not have strong ideological or policy positions on the agreement. What concerns them most is whether or not the deal leads to early elections. The BJP's confused stance has become even more muddled now with some leaders softening their positions but others not getting the memo. The BJP will sit down before the winter session to iron out its party line and make sure its Parliamentarians stick with it.

8. (C) Given that the Left parties are unlikely to relent from their opposition to the agreement, the best outcome for the UPA (and the deal) will be if the Left parties are isolated in the debate while the BJP expresses criticism, but remains uncommitted -- similar to the position taken by the Left in previous nuclear debates. The worst outcome would be

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if the Left, BJP and the regional parties corner the UPA and the "sense of the House" is clearly against the agreement. The most likely scenario is somewhere in the middle with a vigorous debate but both sides claiming victory. If this happens, the UPA government might plausibly take steps to move forward on the deal, if it can find the courage to do so.

Gujarat Elections Holds the Key

-------------------------------

9. (C) Embassy agrees with many observers who believe that if the Parliamentary debate is a draw, the Gujarat election result in December are crucial to whether Congress Party moves forward with the nuclear agreement. Gujarat is a large state, with 26 seats in Parliament. It is a prosperous state which is leading the Indian economic resurgence. It is also one of the most "saffron" states in the country. The BJP has won the last five state assembly elections. It crushed the Congress in 2002 in a lop-sided win in the aftermath of the 2002 riots. By most accounts, Narendra Modi, the poster boy of anti-Muslim Hindu nationalist ideology, has an edge to retain his Chief Minister position for a third straight time (Ref C and H). The state unit of the Congress Party is weak and poorly organized.

10. (C) If the Congress Party can put in a healthy performance to make a dent in this BJP bastion, observers believe the Congress Party will feel politically strong to risk (or even call) a mid-term national poll. In this case, the Prime Minister and the Congress Party would challenge the Left parties by moving forward with the IAEA on the safeguards agreement. It is because of the importance the Congress Party attaches to Gujarat that it is bringing in its top leaders to campaign in the state. Sonia Gandhi launched the campaign over the weekend in Anand, Gujarat. Rahul Gandhi is expected to campaign in the state. If, on the other hand, the Congress Party is trampled again in Gujarat and fails to improve on its 48 seats (out of 182 total seats in the assembly), it will feel vulnerable and will not be tempted to risk early elections. It will then require extraordinary political courage for the UPA to carry out the IAEA talks, which place its full term in office in jeopardy.

Comment: Golda Meir Would be Disgusted

--------------------------------------

11. (C) The Congress Party, led by Sonia Gandhi, has proven especially cautious and nervous in the face of recent extortionist tactics by Prakash Karat. With two huge confrontations in its future -- Parliament and Gujarat -- it will remain true to its cautious form by seeking first to gauge its levels of support before finally being forced -- if absolutely needed -- to take action. With the future of Indian foreign credibility hanging in balance, Sonia Gandhi has been unable to show principled leadership even when it might benefit her party at the polls and reveal Prakash Karat to be the extortionist he is. Mrs. Gandhi never misses and opportunity to miss an opportunity. While remaining publicly restrained and taking care not to be seen as interfering with domestic Indian politics, the Embassy will continue to meet with all political, business and civil society organizations to urge them to support the agreement. We will continue to press the UPA government on the need for early completion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. And, we will continue our efforts to remind the BJP that the US-India civil nuclear agreement is their deal, too. WHITE

The Enigma of Sonia Gandhi's Personality

Dated :Friday, 04 August 2006
C O N F I D E N T I A L



Summary
Maria Shriver, wife of the governor of California and Sonia Gandhi, the most powerful person in India and the head of the ruling Congress party, have a one hour meeting to talk about "women's issues." For her visitors, Mrs Gandhi is warm, even effusive, admirable, informed far from her normal reserved self, her "italian" nature showing through. Reading between the lines reveals however that the warmth may not have been mutual. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
1. (C) Summary: In a relaxed August 3 conversation with California first lady Maria Shriver, Sonia Gandhi revealed a rare glimpse of herself. Usually withdrawn and reserved in public, she spoke at great length and radiated confidence on women's' issues and some aspects of her private life. Mrs. Gandhi demonstrated a strong commitment to a progressive left-of-center agenda aimed at combating socially conservative forces bent on oppressing Indian women. However, she was also realistic, revealing an in-depth knowledge of Indian culture, especially the rural/urban divide. At times suppressing her emotions, she spoke about the compulsions of political life, her parents' objections to her marriage to Rajiv Gandhi and the sacrifices she and her family have made. Her comments and demeanor put the lie to cocktail party suggestions that she courts Manmohan Singh's job. End Summary.

Two Dynasties Meet

------------------

2. (C) Maria Shriver, California's first lady and wife of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, met with Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi on August 3 as part of her official visit to India. Shriver is in India to discuss her various initiatives on women's' affairs and to solicit Indian involvement. She is also laying the groundwork for a proposed trade mission led by Governor Schwarzenegger around February, 2007. After her stay in Delhi, she will go to Dharamshalla to meet the Dalai Lama. In addition to the Gandhi meeting, Shriver met with the head of the National Commission for Women and toured NGO's involved in women's' affairs. Mrs. Gandhi was accompanied by former Cabinet Minister Karan Singh.

Indian Women Bear a Heavy Burden

--------------------------------

3. (C) Shriver and Gandhi engaged in an over one hour exchange that was lively and open and covered many issues, both personal and political. Shriver explained that she was concerned with women's issues, including sexual abuse and exploitation and trafficking. Mrs. Gandhi replied that the situation for women in India is more troubling and traumatic than that in the US and other developed countries, as Indian women must deal with myriad problems not found in the west, such as child labor. In addition, most Indian women live in remote villages with severe "cultural compulsions" that work against women, making it difficult for the GOI to enforce the law. She pointed out that Indian women remain largely uneducated which is a "big problem" for Indian society and makes progress difficult. This compels the GOI to rely on television and radio to reach women with messages aimed at their concerns. Mrs. Gandhi noted that while she had a deep personal interest in women's' issues, she "only rarely" gave personal interviews aimed at female audiences.

And Sonia Bears a Personal Burden

---------------------------------

4. (C) Without prompting and at her own initiative Mrs. Gandhi then spoke at length about her personal life. She revealed that after her mother in law's murder Rajiv Gandhi was under intense pressure to take up the political mantle of the Gandhi family, but both Rajiv and Sonia were intensely

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personal and had no interest in politics. According to Mrs. Gandhi, she urged her husband repeatedly to avoid politics, but he insisted. After Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Minister, Sonia was determined to avoid the limelight and "kept in the background." She clarified that she accompanied her husband to official events, but refrained from making political statements. After her husband's assassination, Mrs. Gandhi withdrew, working only on a charitable foundation established in Rajiv's memory. In a candid revelation of her personal political stance, Mrs. Gandhi stated that "the right was becoming strong in India and Congress weak," tipping her hand and "compelling" her to enter politics to protect the Gandhi family legacy. She also revealed that her children were "not keen" about the idea, but eventually told her, "whatever you decide, we will back you."

Turning Down the PM Spot

------------------------

5. (C) Mrs. Gandhi was reluctant to provide details regarding her decision to turn down the Prime Minister post after the UPA's surprise 2004 electoral victory, stating that "I am often asked about this, but tell people that I will write a book someday with the whole story." She would only say that she "felt better" that someone else became PM and "did not regret" her decision. Shriver congratulated Mrs. Gandhi for her resoluteness and described her as "courageous." Clearly embarrassed by this adulation, Mrs. Gandhi made no response. She elaborated, at Karan Singh's insistence, saying that she was under lots of pressure, as the "party workers" were "very upset." They "could not understand" why she, as party President, was not taking up the post, since they had voted for her and won a majority.

Politics and Women

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6. (C) Shriver noted that she chairs a "Women's Conference" that brings 11,000 women to California to discuss relevant issues, and reinforced the point that "women can change the world." Shriver invited Mrs. Gandhi to attend next year. She pointed out that last year's keynote speaker was Sandra Day O'Connor, who spoke about balancing public and private life, and how she left the Supreme Court to look after her ailing husband and spend more time with her children. Shriver emphasized that Justice O'Connor also did not want to enter public life but was "pushed by her husband," and noted how difficult it is to be a wife and mother and play a public role. Mrs. Gandhi made no commitment to attend.

Indian Steps to Bring Justice

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7. (C) Mrs. Gandhi explained the steps that her UPA government had taken and planned to take to help women achieve greater social mobility and rights. She explained that the GOI had instituted a "Panchayati Raj" program under which major decisions regarding the economic development of villages are made by Panchayats (village councils). To ensure female participation, Rajiv Gandhi had "reserved" 33 percent of the positions on the Panchayats for women. Although there were "some complaints" that the women were "manipulated by their husbands," Mrs. Gandhi asserted that "research had confirmed that women will invariably take the right decisions." She noted that the UPA now wants to extend the same reservations to Parliament and the Legislative

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Assemblies. Mrs. Gandhi confirmed that currently the number of female MPs was "very small," as "some parties believe that women should not be in power."

The Indian Contradiction

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8. (C) Shriver pointed out that her trip had made her aware of the "great contradiction" between a society in which women occupied many leadership positions, including, at times, Prime Minister," but still were denied many basic rights. Mrs. Gandhi agreed with Shriver, noting that several Indian states had female Chief Ministers, and that an increasing numbers of Indian women are CEOs of major corporations, doctors, and scientists, and "we will keep fighting." She explained that the situation for women varied from state to state, and that South India was "more progressive" than the North for various historical and cultural reasons, and that, for example, the state of Kerala supplied nurses to much of the Middle East.

Possible Indian Collaboration

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9. (C) Praising the contribution of Indians and Indian-Americans to California, Shriver suggested that perhaps the GOI could help the state government combat its teacher and nursing shortage. She also noted that her family is very involved in the Special Olympics program and would like 500,000 participants for the Indian Special Olympics and hoped that Mrs. Gandhi would attend the events scheduled for November 6. Mrs. Shriver pointed out that those with intellectual disabilities were making great strides in the US, with many becoming self sufficient. This is necessary, she pointed out, "as we do not have the relevant institutions in the US." Mrs. Gandhi conceded that Indian government institutions for the intellectually disabled are "nothing to write home about," leaving parents and NGOs to deal with the problem, and that in rural areas, such children are "often hidden" and their disability "kept secret."

Slow Social Change

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10. (C) Mrs. Gandhi was not the least defensive about the gravity of India's social problems. When asked by Shriver about adoption, she noted that adoptions remained rare in India and most Indians continued to "see nothing wrong" in that. It is a "happy change," however, that more families are taking in orphans. She readily agreed with Shriver that many Indians still considered female children as "a problem" and preferred males and, as a result, more girls are abandoned than boys. Mrs. Gandhi reiterated that "education is the key to change" as much legislation is not enforced. This makes it necessary to "convince families and make them understand" to bring about positive change.

Personal Insights Into an Active Life

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11. (C) Mrs. Gandhi then provided personal insights into her life, saying that she travels constantly all over India, often to remote areas to visit the common people, as "it is only by going out and interacting with people that we are in a better position to understand their problems and determine what they want." She confided that there has been a big

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change in the Indian mindset regarding education. Earlier, parents were not very interested in ensuring their children were educated, while today, "99 percent want to send their children to school." Everywhere you go in India today, she noted, you see children in their uniforms heading for school, and this is "something that makes us happy." In addition to education, Indian parents want their children to have access to basic health care - "doctors and medicines," and some assurance that they will have a job after they complete their education. Mrs. Gandhi worried that there will be huge numbers of young Indians leaving school with no guarantee of finding a job.

Population Control Off the Screen

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12. (C) Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that "population control" is a political taboo in India after Indira Gandhi was voted out of office over this issue. Although she insisted allegations of forced vasectomies and other abuses were "highly exaggerated" and "politically motivated," the historical memory has forced the UPA to focus on raising awareness and providing basic health services and means that progress on reducing the birth rate will be "slow." Again, education will be the key, as demonstrated by the small family norm in urban areas.

Culture and Fighting AIDS

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13. (C) Karan Singh pointed out that population reduction and AIDS control are linked as it requires condom distribution to combat both problems. Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that Northeast India faces a severe AIDS problem, as it is a transshipment point for narcotics with a growing drug problem. Cultural factors also inhibit AIDS control, as the government "cannot be open" with condom distribution because of "certain mindsets." This compels the GOI to find an "appropriate way" to communicate with the population. Shriver responded that the US, as a multicultural society, faces many of the same problems, as men from some cultural backgrounds "don't want anything to do" with family planning and AIDS prevention. The key, she emphasized, was "empowering women to demand action on these issues."

India and the US

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14. (C) Shriver observed that there was "no anti-Americanism" in India and that Indians from diverse backgrounds, cultures and religions have successfully found ways to coexist. Mrs. Gandhi replied that Indians are "inherently tolerant" as they have co-existed for centuries. Karan Singh added that the "freedom movement of Mahatma Gandhi" also played a crucial role as it was inclusive, pluralistic and emphasized that multiplicity of Indian culture. Mrs. Gandhi jokingly pointed out that the "Indian Left is anti-American," but then agreed that its stance was aimed at "American policy" rather than the American people. Karan Singh emphasized that he and "most Indians" objected to many aspects of current American policy but held no brief against the American people. Mrs. Gandhi also pointed out that many Indian Muslims "resent certain policies of the US."

More Personal Revelations

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15. (C) Mrs. Gandhi revealed that her own parents objected to her marriage to Rajiv Gandhi and she "resented their position" and went ahead and married him anyway. She also noted that she felt that her gender has never been an issue in her political life and that Indira Gandhi also made the same observation. In Hinduism, "women are seen as goddesses and no puja (worship) can take place without them," while, ironically, oppression of women is common. She also revealed that common women in India's rural areas do not hold her in great awe and don't think of her as a great personality, as "their priorities are so different."

Comment: A Relaxed Gandhi Provides A Rare Personal Insight

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16. (C) Sonia Gandhi is often stiff and detached when in public. This was a more relaxed Sonia, possibly because she felt a personal rapport with Maria Shriver. In this more relaxed setting, Sonia Gandhi revealed a left of center political orientation which stresses the strong role of the government in ensuring social progress and her inherent opposition to the social conservatism of the Hindu right. At the same time, she entertained no illusions that she or the UPA will bring about rapid social change or uplift quickly India's oppressed women. Instead, she embraced an evolutionary and patient approach based on a broad knowledge of Indian culture and traditions. She was, for example, acutely aware of the vast divide between rural and urban India and the inherent difficulty of pushing entrenched villagers into the 21st century. Deeply hurt by personal tragedy, she has erected a strong and stoic persona to prevent public access to her personal space. Whenever she spoke of the deaths of her husband and mother-in-law, she struggled to keep her emotions in check. Despite her carefully erected Indian persona, her basic Italian personality is clearly evident in her mannerisms, speech and interests. She presents an intriguing enigma of a warm private personality that remains concealed and is available only to her closest confidants and family members.

17. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) PYATT