Monday, December 20, 2010

Torture in the worlds largest Democracy


Dated 06 April 2005
Classification:S E C R E T
SUBJECT: ICRC FRUSTRATED WITH INDIAN GOVERNMENT

Summary
The International Committee of the Red Cross – which communicates its findings only to governments and shuns publicity – briefed American diplomats on widespread severe torture in Indian prisons in Kashmir between 2002 and 2004. The humanitarian organisation argued that the Indian government "condoned" the mistreatment but pointed nonetheless to some signs of progress otherwise.
1. (S) Summary: In a April 1 confidential briefing on GOI detention centers in Kashmir, ICRC XXXXXXXXXXXX described to D/Polcouns torture methods and relatively stable trend lines of prisoner abuses by Indian security forces, based on data derived from 1491 interviews with detainees during 2002-2004. The continued ill-treatment of detainees, despite longstanding ICRC-GOI dialogue, have led the ICRC to conclude that the New Delhi condones torture. The MEA/MHA recently protested ICRC presence and activities in J&K, and keeps the organization in legal limbo, but allows their operations to continue. Security forces in J&K are open to ICRC seminars in international humanitarian law (IHL). ICRC stressed that it was not asking for USG action, but may seek to mobilize support in the future, if its relations with the GOI do not improve. Separately, the media reported that COAS LTG JJ Singh put human rights issues at the center of an April 4 conference of army commanders. End Summary. ICRC XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX gave us a confidential briefing on the ICRC Kashmir program, the first such detailed and organized presentation Embassy has received in a number of years. The XXXXXXXXXXXX have limited the information they have exchanged with us to general comments on the human rights situation in Kashmir and the Northeast "in order to respect their confidentiality agreement with the GOI," with which relations have been strained. XXXXXXXXXXXX intimated that the reason he was departing from this practice was ICRC annoyance with the GOI, and his view that the USG would be an ally in ICRC attempts to regularize its status in India. The UK, Holland, and France would receive the same briefing, he stated.

Interaction

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3. (S) ICRC has been active in India for 23 years, but signed its first and only MOU in 1995, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. Since the last ministerial in 1998, contacts have been at periodic Roundtables with the MEA and MHA, led on the Indian side by a Joint Secretary (A/S equivalent). The atmosphere at these meetings has usually been testy, with GOI interlocutors singling out some ICRC activities as "not part of the MOU," and occasionally claiming that data presented are "not specific enough" (even going to far as to call some of them "lies"). At recent Roundtables, ICRC has provided thick books to the GOI, which has over time raised fewer questions about the data and focused more on activities that were not carefully delineated in the MOU. Between these meetings, ICRC contact is kept to the Deputy Secretary level (the second lowest in protocol terms). Thus far, ICRC staff had not had problems with visas, he stated. (Note: The MOU was facilitated by the Embassy in the early 1990s and resulted from extensive interaction between the Mission Front Office and XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note)

4. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, a MEA Note Verbale from January 30 stated that the GOI values its relations with the ICRC, and also its instruction in international humanitarian law (IHL) to security forces. However, he said the MEA also protested the ICRC's presence in Srinagar, asking it to "wind up" its operations, advising that its "public activities must stop" (believed to be a reference to a seminar ICRC staff held at Kashmir University on IHL in 2004), and warning against "unauthorized contacts with separatist elements" (which ICRC acknowledges have taken place, including with XXXXXXXXXXXX). (Comment: This GOI request to "wind up" operations in Srinagar seems more like a warning to keep to the letter of the MOU than a real threat to close down there. End Comment)

Detention Center Visits

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5. (S) ICRC staff made 177 visits to detention centers in J&K and elsewhere (primarily the Northeast) between 2002-2004, meeting with 1491 detainees, 1296 of which were private interviews. XXXXXXXXXXXX considered this group a representative sample of detainees in Kashmir, but stressed that they had not been allowed access to all detainees. In 852 cases, detainees reported what ICRC refers to as "IT" (ill-treatment): 171 persons were beaten, the remaining 681 subjected to one or more of six forms of torture: electricity (498 cases), suspension from ceiling (381), "roller" (a round metal object put on the thighs of sitting person, which prison personnel then sit on, crushing muscles -- 294); stretching (legs split 180 degrees -- 181), water (various forms -- 234), or sexual (302). Numbers add up to more than 681, as many detainees were subjected to more than one form of IT. ICRC stressed that all the branches of the security forces used these forms of IT and torture.

GOI Points to Improvements

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6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that during recent ICRC interactions with the GOI, officials have maintained that the human rights situation in Kashmir is "much better than it was in the 1990s," a view he also agreed with. Security forces no longer roused entire villages in the middle of the night and detained inhabitants indiscriminately, as they had as recently as the late 1990s. There is "more openness from medical doctors and the police," who have conceded that 95 percent of the information on particular cases is accurate. Ten years ago, there were some 300 detention centers; now there are "a lot fewer," he stated.

General Observations

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7. (S) While acknowledging these improvements, XXXXXXXXXXXXmade a number of additional observations based on ICRC experience in Kashmir that indicate persistent problems:

-- There is a regular and widespread use of IT and torture by the security forces during interrogation; -- This always takes place in the presence of officers; -- ICRC has raised these issues with the GOI for more than 10 years; -- Because practice continues, ICRC is forced to conclude that GOI condones torture; -- Dialogue on prison conditions is OK, dialogue on treatment of detainees is not; -- Security forces were rougher on detainees in the past; -- Detainees were rarely militants (they are routinely killed), but persons connected to or believed to have information about the insurgency; -- ICRC has never obtained access to the "Cargo Building," the most notorious detention center in Srinagar; and -- Current practices continue because "security forces need promotions," while for militants, "the insurgency has become a business."

Trend Lines Constant

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8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX showed us two graphs depicting data obtained from interviews conducted during the past two years, with lines and bars tracing the various kinds of ill-treatment. All the lines were zig-zag in nature, but within bands and largely horizontal. There were no clear trend lines, up or down. The lines at the end of 2004 were in an order of magnitude roughly comparable to 2002. He did not attribute the spikes up or down to particular policies in place at particular times, but called them "ad hoc changes."

Next Steps

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9. (S) The ICRC official indicated that his organization would seek another Roundtable with the MEA and MHA between April and June. The ICRC New Delhi office also wants its President to visit India, to raise these and other issues in a meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. XXXXXXXXXXXX considered this "very important," although stressed that it was not agreed. After 23 years of activities in country, the ICRC also wants to regularize its status by concluding a formal agreement with the GOI like that enjoyed by UN agencies. Most importantly, ICRC seeks a "purposive, rather than restrictive" interpretation of its existing MOU and and end to IT and torture.

Bright Spot

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10. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the one bright spot in ICRC activities was with the security forces. Staff have conducted more than 300 sessions with SF on IHL in Kashmir and elsewhere, which have touched an estimated 20,000 junior grade officers in one way or another. Discussions are underway for further sessions with officers at the headquarters of the Southern Command in Pune (Maharashtra) and Northern Command in Udhampur (J&K).

COAS: Velvet Glove, Iron Fist

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11. (C) In a separate but related development, the media reported that COAS LTG JJ Singh made military discipline issues the centerpoint of a conference for army commanders April 5, following reports that Defense Minister Mukherjee was disturbed by continued reports of human rights violations by the security forces. Addressing the conference, Mukherkee observed that "we must realize that while dealing with insurgents, we are operating within our own territory and allegations of human rights violations will not only sully the image of the army, but also reduce our effectiveness in tackling militancy." As part of his "velvet glove, iron fist" approach, Singh has repeatedly stipulated that his officers should use "minimum force" and avoid "collateral damage" in their units in order to reverse declining standards in discipline.

Comment

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12. (S) The fact that ICRC reversed its practice of the last several years to provide this briefing to us reflects its frustration with the MEA and MHA, although we note that their experience with security forces in J&K is clearly better than in the past, pragmatic and bordering on the positive. The data showing stable trend lines of ill-treatment and torture in detention centers are very disturbing, because the practice continues unabated. It does not appear that the GOI is planning anything precipitous, but the ICRC is clearly upping the ante with the GOI, which it charges with "not playing ball." ICRC considers the status quo "unacceptable," and wants substantive dialogue with the GOI. Their approach to us may be a prelude to a more assertive stance vis-a-vis New Delhi, which could be helpful in goading the Home Ministry and MOD to taking firmer action, but also risks backfiring if the GOI starts to back out of a long-negotiated working relationship which has produced valuable results over the past decade. MULFORD

Terror Talk over Tea leads to Trouble



Monday, 03 August 2009, 14:29
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: REACHING OUT TO RAHUL GANDHI AND OTHER YOUNG
PARLIAMENTARIANS


Summary
In a review of the career and potential of Rahul Gandhi, 40-year old heir apparent to the leadership of India's ruling Congress party, the US ambassador reports conversations with the young politician, speaking appreciatively of recent statements and potential for the future. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
1. (C) Summary: In a candid conversation with the Ambassador during the July 20 lunch hosted by Prime Minister Singh for the Secretary, Indian Congress Party General Secretary Rahul Gandhi described his focus on upcoming state and local elections, expressed concerns regarding the challenges surrounding the UPA coalition's ability to implement its programs, and speculated about radicalization among Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi was interested in engaging with the Ambassador and could become a key interlocutor, along with other young members of Parliament, as we pursue a Strategic Dialogue with India. End Summary.

2. (C) During the Secretary's July 20 meetings in New Delhi (see reftel), Prime Minister Singh hosted a lunch in honor of the Secretary. Among the invitees was Indian Congress Party General Secretary Rahul Gandhi, as well as other prominent figures from politics, business and civil society. Gandhi, who was seated next to the Ambassador, shared his views on a range of political topics, social challenges, and electoral issues for the Congress Party in the next five years.

Rural Strategy

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3. (C) Gandhi stressed that his focus in the upcoming months would be on state assembly elections in Maharashtra and party building efforts at the local level. He was busy trying to recruit more appealing candidates to run for Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) positions nationwide. Gandhi's focus was on finding younger party members who would not carry some of the baggage of older Congress candidates. He aimed at rebuilding party structures in small towns and rural areas to attract voters and believed the main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was vulnerable there. He did not seem to be as focused on electoral efforts in bigger cities, such as Delhi and Mumbai.

Honeymoon is Over

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4. (C) Noting that the Congress Party victory in this past spring's parliamentary elections had put the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in a comfortable position, Gandhi still expressed concerns about the numerous challenges regarding the UPA's ability to implement its programs in Parliament. He said that the honeymoon period had been short and he now expected the BJP and Left Parties would be unrelenting critics of the government's program. Speaking while the budget session of Parliament was ongoing, Gandhi touched on the difficulties in keeping the UPA coalition on the right track. (Note: This conversation took place before the full scope of opposition to the July 16 Indo-Pakistani joint statement in Sharm el Sheikh had become apparent. End Note.)

Creeping Radicalization?

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5. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query about Lashkar-e-Taiba's activities in the region and immediate threat to India, Gandhi said there was evidence of some support for the group among certain elements in India's indigenous Muslim community. However, Gandhi warned, the bigger threat may be the growth of radicalized Hindu groups, which create religious tensions and political confrontations with the Muslim community. (Comment: Gandhi was referring to the tensions created by some of the more polarizing figures in the BJP such as Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi.) The risk of a "home-grown" extremist front, reacting to terror attacks coming from Pakistan or from Islamist groups in India, was a growing concern and one that demanded constant attention.

Comment

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6. (C) Gandhi was forthright in describing the challenges faced by the Congress Party and the UPA government in the months ahead. Over the past four years, he was an elusive contact, but he could be interested in reaching out to the United States, given a thoughtful, politically sensitive and strategic approach on our part. We will seek other opportunities to engage with him and with other promising

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young members of the new generation of parliamentarians. Gandhi mentioned that in the recent election 60 members of the new Parliament were 45 or younger. In a system long viewed as relatively static, the influx of new faces and the rising profile of young leaders like Rahul Gandhi provides us an opening to expand the constituency in support of the strategic partnership with a long term horizon.

ROEMER

Rahul Gandhi not a "white Knight" of Politics.


Monday, 22 February 2010, 08:52
C O N F I D E N T I A L
Summary
A US diplomat romps through three weeks of Indian politics, from the chauvinism of the Shiv Sena party to a new law allowing gay couples to celebrate Valentine's day. Key passages highlighted in yellow.



1. (U) Below is a compilation of political highlights from Embassy New Delhi for January 30 - February 19, 2010, that did not feature in our other reporting.

My Name Is Rahul

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2. (SBU) Rahul Gandhi's Mumbai visit and his skirmishing with the Maharashtra chauvinist Shiv Sena party shows he is becoming increasingly sure-footed in his political instincts. He first hurled some blunt words at the Thackerays and Shiv Sena's xenophobic agenda. These were widely and sympathetically reported around the country. He then took it a step further when the Shiv Sena issued "Keep Off Maharashtra" threats by going to the Thackeray's home ground of Mumbai, where he continued to take shots at them. He topped it off by showing the common touch when he made a last minute change in his itinerary to travel across town in a second-class train compartment. All in all, a public relations bonanza for Rahul as the press gave wide coverage to his Siv Sena bashing and his train ride. Forty Shiv Sena activists were detained by the police for Rahul's visit.

Don't Talk About My Mother

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3. (U) Not to be outdone, the Shiv Sena has been grabbing headlines in recent days with its attacks on Rahul Gandhi, Reliance Group's Mukesh Ambani and Bollywood icon, Shah Rukh Khan. The Shiv Sena has also been in a tussle with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which is the parent organization of its ally, the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP), over the rights of North Indian migrants in Mumbai. Media reports a rift between the RSS and the Shiv Sena over the Sena's verbal attacks on migrants from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Rahul Gandhi came to the defense of North Indians living and working in Mumbai during an ongoing visit to Bihar by telling press that the Sena was irrelevant and that all Indians had a right to reside freely in India. Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray responded by launching an attack on Rahul Gandhi's "Italian Mummy," referring to Italian-born UPA chief Sonia Gandhi.

The Tiger Roars Again?

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4. (U) Raj Thackeray-led vitriolic splinter group, the MNS, has cut into the Shiv Sena's support base in recent years. The MNS usurped the Shiv Sena's xenophobic platform to exclude non-Maharashtrians from power and influence in Maharashtra. Finding themselves increasingly marginalized and losing support from their anti-migrant Marathi-speaking base, the Shiv Sena has gone on a publicity and campaign blitz to position itself as the undisputed champion of ethnic Marathi speakers.

The Bollywood Show Must Go On

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5. (U) The Shiv Sena had threatened to ban screenings of Shah Rukh Khan's upcoming movie, "My Name is Khan", because Shah Rukh Khan publicly lamented the absence of Pakistani cricket players in India's professional cricket league for the coming season. Shiv Sena goons burnt posters of Khan's upcoming movie and protested in front of his home, asking Khan to "move to Pakistan." Khan himself did not bid on any Pakistani players as co-owner of one of the frachises. While some theater owners refrained from screening the film on its Friday opening due to security concerns, a show of force by the police convinced theaters to roll out a full release on Saturday. With protests and controversy generating far more international buzz than the typical Bollywood movie, Khan's new movie opened to packed audiences in Mumbai and elsewhere.

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New Indian Youth Congress President Appointed

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6. (U) On February 3, the Congress Party appointed Rajiv Satav the President of its youth wing, the Indian Youth Congress (IYC). Party General Secretary Rahul Gandhi hand-picked Satav for the job, surprising political observers who had expected an election for the top IYC post per Gandhi's previous statements about making the party "more democratic." Contacts speculate that the appointment of Satav -- a native of the state of Maharashtra -- is intended to enhance the Congress Party's position in the state. A Congress Party-Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) coalition governs Maharashtra, but the coalition partners have been feuding over rising food prices. (Note: The Congress Party has repeatedly tried to shift the blame for rising prices on to NCP chief Sharad Pawar, who is also the Agriculture and Food Supplies Minister in the Congress Party's United Progressive Alliance government in Delhi. End Note.) Gandhi's IYC pick may signal that Maharashtra is the next data point along the Congress Party's trend of going it alone in some large states where it had previously been reduced to a junior partner or a non-entity.

7. (U) Rajiv Satav, 35, is the son of former Maharashtra Minister Rajnitai Satav. Satav was elected to the Maharashtra legislative assembly for the first time in 2009, following his big political break when he was nominated as the Maharashtra Youth Congress chief in 2008. Satav has accompanied Rahul Gandhi on several high profile visits, including his recent tour of Bihar and his train ride in Mumbai. As the Youth Congress chief, Satav will face the challenge of increasing youth participation in the political process, while countering the influence of the Raj Thackeray-led MNS in Maharashtra, whose aggressive and street-smart style has attracted Indian youth.

Valentine's Day Vignettes: Rainbows and Pink Hearts

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8. (U) February 14 marked the first time some couples were able to paint the town pink in India. On July 2, the Delhi High Court overturned some provisions of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, a colonial-era law that outlawed same gender sex between two consenting adults. The GOI allowed the historic ruling to stand after deciding not to appeal it. Over six months later, Archie's, India's largest greeting card company, gave the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community another cause for celebration by selling cards targeted for the community in 500 stores across New Delhi and major Indian cities to celebrate Valentine's Day. Archie's spokesman Yohan Arya told the Times of India that the company had been considering making available several LGBT cards for some time. They decided the time was right after the July 2 high court judgment. "The court judgment ...clearly said that it's legal to be gay... so we felt this was the right time to add these cards," Arya added. (It is not yet known how well these new cards sold.) New Delhi also embraced the LGBT community by focusing on them as customers for Valentine's Day celebrations. Clubs and lounges were buzzing with theme parties and special cocktails, with some bars openly encouraging LGBT couples - the first time this has happened in New Delhi.

A Peaceful Valentine

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9. (U) The Sri Ram Sena (SRS), a small, fringe Hindu extremist group which has in the past engaged in isolated violence against young men and women celebrating Valentine's Day, lost its momentum this year. The leader of the SRS, Pramod Muthalik, claims that he is fighting for India, the youth, and Indian culture. Valentine's Day, he alleges "is

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aimed at ruining (Indian) culture." This year, his message was lost, as the Sri Ram Sena joined ranks with the Shiv Sena and spent the days leading up to February 14 fighting the release of Shah Rukh Khan's latest Bollywoodblockbuster. The SRS faced additional humiliation on February 11 when an individual "attacked" Muthalik. While Muthalik was preparing to participate in a debate on Valentine's Day in an open air theater, six young men barged in, dragged him off stage, and blackened his face with ink. The shocked Muthalik fell down during the melee before he could be rescued by his supporters. The police arrested two of the perpetrators and brought three more youths in for questioning. With its leader brought down a peg, the SRS was not heard from during this year's Valentine's Day celebrations.

Update on Tibetan Refugee Flow

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10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff on February 4 that an average of 2,500 to 3,500 refugees from Tibet typically arrive in Dharamsala each year, with most returning to Tibet after receiving an audience with the Dalai Lama. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that from 1980 to November 2009 87,096 refugees were processed by the Dharamsala Reception Center (RC) and that 46,620 returned to Tibet after a short pilgrimage in India. Most of those who do stay in India are children who then attend schools run by Tibetan Children's Villages. XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both highlighted to PolOff that, following the March 2008 uprising in Tibet, the number of Tibetan refugees markedly decreased, with only about 650 refugees arriving at the RC from April 2008 to March 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that Beijing has asked Kathmandu to step up patrols of Nepali border forces and make it more difficult for Tibetans to enter Nepal. XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated this belief to PolOff during a XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting in Delhi, stating "the Chinese government rewards (Nepali forces)" by providing financial incentives to officers who hand over Tibetans attempting to exit China. XXXXXXXXXXXX was optimistic that flow of refugees will soon go back to normal levels because admission statistics for 2010 are surpassing those from an equivalent period in 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX ROEMER

Don't tell us what to do, India warns US


Thursday, 01 May 2008, 11:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001194
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/01/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, EPET, KISL, ENRG, ECON, ETRD, IR, IN
SUBJECT: MENON SAYS AHMADINEJAD PLAYED TO MASSES DURING
INDIA VISIT
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)

Summary
In a meeting shortly after controversial stopover visit of Iranian president - who told Indian prime minister that the "world is changing in Iran's favour" - Delhi's top diplomat was uncomplimentary about the visitor to the US ambassador but told the US not to tell India who to meet or not to meet. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
1. (C) Summary: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon related to the Ambassador May 1 that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the Prime Minister during his April 29 stop in Delhi that the world is changing in Iran's favor. When asked for specifics, Menon noted, Ahmadinejad voiced more mild opinions, and called for strengthening the governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Regarding the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, Menon said that the Prime Minister laid down three criteria that would determine whether India signed a deal with Iran: commercial and economic viability, assured supply, and security. Menon confided that Ahmadinejad concocted the widely reported 45-day window for negotiating the pipeline when he talked to the press on his way to the airport, and Menon doubted that the countries would resolve the outstanding pipeline issues anytime soon. The Ambassador underlined that senior leaders in the U.S. Congress will likely criticize India for giving a platform to the leader of a country engaged in killing American soldiers in Iraq, developing nuclear weapons with which to blackmail other countries, and sponsoring terrorism worldwide. End Summary.

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Ahmadinejad Broadly Ideological But Mild on Specifics

- - -

2. (C) Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon related to the Ambassador May 1 that he wanted to provide a briefing of the April 29 "transit stop" in Delhi by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (Note: Menon had originally requested the meeting on the evening of April 30, but rescheduled when the Prime Minister summoned Menon to his residence. End Note.) Menon outlined that, after landing at the airport at 16:30, Ahmadinejad met the Indian President for 45 minutes, followed by a meeting and dinner with the Prime Minister, in which Menon participated. During the meeting with the Prime Minister, Menon related, Ahmadinejad described a world that has improved from Iran's point of view, and would continue to shift in Iran's favor. Menon admitted that "I had not realized how ideological Ahmadinejad is." He noted that while Ahmadinejad did not attack the U.S. explicitly, he opined that the U.S. has destabilized Iraq and would withdraw soon. When asked about specifics, Menon continued, Ahmadinejad became "relatively mild." Regarding Afghanistan, Ahmadinejad noted that there was no alternative to Hamid Karzai and called for strengthening the government in Kabul, and regarding Iraq, he called for greater law and order, but considered the Maliki government good. "There was no fire and brimstone in the details," Menon observed.

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India Lays Down Criteria for Pipeline

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3. (C) Menon said that the discussion with the Prime Minister focused on the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, and Ahmadinejad made clear that he aimed to produce an agreement in Delhi. However, the Prime Minister laid down that India required more detailed discussions to obtain three conditions that would allow India to sign up to the IPI: commercial and economic viability, assured supply, and security of the pipeline. Ahmadinejad gave his word that the pipeline would satisfy those conditions, and asked that Indian leaders trust him. He then agreed to more detailed discussions, but to commence within a month. "We said no to artificial deadlines," Menon stressed to the Ambassador. Ahmadinejad later told the press that the countries have 45 days to work out an agreement, but Menon maintained, "I don't know where he got that number from, but his goal in India was to say that." (Note: Menon has not corrected Ahmadinejad's statement in public. End Note.) "We made clear that our issues are more than just the price of a transaction," he underlined, averred that it would take a long time to resolve the conditions set out by the Indian government.

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India Pushes Iran for Full Disclosure in IAEA

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4. (C) Regarding Iran's nuclear program, Menon related that Ahmadinejad reiterated his public points that Iran intended the program for peaceful use. Menon said that the Prime Minister acknowledged Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program, but urged Ahmadinejad to assure the international community of its peaceful intentions by coming clean with the IAEA, which Iran has not done. Ahmadinejad also made clear that the uranium enrichment program would continue, Menon added. India's votes against Iran in the IAEA did not come up, he continued. Menon thanked the Ambassador for the April 27 briefing prior to Ahmadinejad's arrival, and enthusiastically remarked that he found it "very useful."

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Ahmadinejad Performed in Delhi

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5. (C) Menon puzzled about Ahmadinejad's "self-congratulatory, self-referential" style, which he found particularly odd during an exchange about oil prices, during which Ahmadinejad bragged that the cost of oil would remain high. Ahmadinejad also bad-mouthed other countries, including China, which he claimed had put all its money in U.S. dollars and now had nothing left. As a result, Menon judged, "we assume he speaks badly about us to other countries." Menon also noted that Ahmadinejad refrained from direct attacks on Israel, and did not bring up the Indian launch of an Israeli satellite nor the U.S.-India relationship. Overall, Menon assessed, Ahmadinejad appeared to have performed in Delhi for his domestic audience, showing Iranian voters that he can still travel and interact with other countries.

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Expect Senior-Level Criticism, Ambassador Warns

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6. (C) The Ambassador underlined that Americans, particularly members of Congress, will view Ahmadinejad's visit as India providing a platform for an enemy of the U.S. Members of Congress and the Administration strongly believe that Ahmadinejad is guilty of killing Americans in Iraq, developing a nuclear weapons program to blackmail the world, and sponsoring international terrorist activities, the Ambassador outlined. Moreover, the U.S. has maintained a long-term alliance with Israel, which Ahmadinejad has called for "wiping off the face of the earth," the Ambassador added. The average American will wonder why the U.S. has gone out of its way to have a nuclear cooperation initiative with India, when India is so friendly to Iran, he warned. "I cannot predict what the effect of this visit will be," he cautioned, but noted that he expected the Ahmadinejad stop to exercise those members of Congress who have gone out of their way on India's behalf.

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Nothing Should Upset You, Menon Presses

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7. (C) Menon responded that "there is nothing in this visit that should upset you." He emphasized that the Indian government had little choice to say yes when the Iranian government requested a stop in transit. Moreover, Menon explained, India and Iran need to talk about Afghanistan and energy issues. "We can talk with him without affecting our other relationships," Menon contended, and cited the strong India-Israel relationship that withstood India's flirtation with Iran. Menon also cautioned the U.S. against telling India what to do, especially in public. "This government has to be seen following an independent foreign policy, not responding to dictation from the U.S.," he stated. He recognized that Iran presents a global problem, and the U.S. and India differ in how to fix the situation because of geography. For instance, Menon pressed, India must work with Iran to deal with Afghanistan.

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Ambassador Asks If India Is Ready for Prime Time

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8. (C) The Ambassador recounted that the U.S. government and Congress stood up for India by passing the Hyde Act because they believed that as a rising power, India must come into the global nonproliferation system. However, the Ambassador posited, those supporters will wonder if India is ready for prime time since it "let the enemy in and did not stand up and say, 'don't do this.'" Menon countered that such a position sounded like what the Communists have accused the U.S. of doing. The Ambassador clarified that the Communists suspect the Indian and U.S. governments of trading foreign policies in a clandestine cabal, when in this case, the Ambassador simply wished to make the Indian government aware of the possible repercussions that come from hosting the hostile Ahmadinejad.

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Comment: India and Iran Relationship Needs No U.S. Interference

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9. (C) By providing Ahmadinejad with a platform to berate the U.S., the Indian government has attempted to prove that it has an independent foreign policy, as the Communist critics have demanded since India's first vote against Iran in the IAEA in 2005. By kowtowing to political concerns, India has put at risk its image of an emerging, responsible major player in the world. We have warned the Indian government quietly about the implications, but sharp, public comments from the U.S. government will only push India and Iran closer together. MULFORD

India Courting the Junta.


Tuesday, 02 November 2004, 08:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006983

SUBJECT: INDIA ENCOURAGES DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
REF: A. 10/23 CAMP-PYATT E-MAIL
B. NEW DELHI 6881
Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
An outspoken Indian foreign affairs official told American counterparts in Delhi that democracy leader Aung San Sui Kyi's "time had come and gone" and that democracy could only be encouraged through "greater engagement" with the ruling regime. India was best placed to do this because the United Nations is no longer credible and the E.U. is too shabby and short-sighted. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
1. (C) Summary: India underlined its concerns about the lack of democracy in Burma during the recent visit of Rangoon's military leader Than Shwe, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself delivering the message, MEA Joint Secretary (South East Asia - I) Mitra Vashishta told us on

SIPDIS November 1. The decision to encourage democracy in Rangoon reflects the GOI belief that India is best placed to help Burma reform, that Aung San Sui 's "time has come and gone," and that democracy will take root in Burma only through greater engagement and people-to-people ties. Vashishta cited the October 29-31 visit to New Delhi of UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail as evidence of India's resolve to stay engaged on democracy in Burma. The GOI would welcome US suggestions on how to best to promote democracy there, and has agreed to provide grants and limited military equipment to Rangoon in an attempt to encourage cooperation against anti-India insurgents located along the Indo-Burma border. However, there are no Indian plans to conduct joint military operations with the junta. PolCouns stressed our concerns about the safety and treatment of ASSK and the democratic opposition under Burma's new Prime Minister (ref A), and urged India to continue to press for democratic reform in Rangoon. End Summary.

Democracy

---------

2. (C) Democracy topped India's agenda for the October 24-29 visit of Burma's military leader Than Shwe, MEA Joint Secretary (South East Asia - I) Mitra Vashishta told PolCouns

SIPDIS and Poloff on November 1. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself raised the issue with Than Shwe "in a much more intense way than could be expressed" in the media, she said, noting that India had decided to raise the issue of democracy with Burma despite potentially negative consequences for the relationship. Vashishta reported that New Delhi had to battle for the inclusion of a joint statement paragraph emphasizing India's desire to see "a stable, peaceful, prosperous and democratic Myanmar." She commented that the Burmese delegation was "willing to do anything" to have that paragraph removed, adding that the inclusion of the paragraph was a "coup for India." The final version of the document released on October 29 "expressed support for national reconciliation and an early transition to democracy in Myanmar."

3. (C) Asked about New Delhi's plan to further encourage democracy in Burma, Vashishta responded that Rangoon considers India a democratic role model, and emphasized that the GOI has the "best credentials" to promote democracy there. She mused that democracy could only be established through grass-roots initiatives, and stressed that India would do "whatever it takes" to empower the people of Burma in this respect. Referring to the increased people-to-people ties between India and Pakistan, Vashishta said that the GOI plans to pursue a similar strategy with Burma by promoting culture and sports links between the two countries. "We are much less bothered by the situation in Burma than in Pakistan," she noted, adding that she would welcome US suggestions on how to encourage greater reform in Rangoon.

4. (C) According to Vashishta, democracy in Burma is too closely linked with the greatly respected Aung San Sui Kyi (ASSK), whose "day has come and gone." She said that Than Shwe had expressed a commitment to democracy during the visit, and speculated that he would be more apt to bring about democratic reform if he could do so without losing face. PolCouns underlined US concerns about the lack of democracy in Burma and expressed the hope that India would continue to press this issue with the junta.

Engaging Burma, Meeting India's Strategic Needs

--------------------------------------------- --

5. (C) Describing the Than Shwe trip as "entirely devoted to India's interests," Vashishta stated that New Delhi decided to proceed with the visit, even after the ouster of former-PM Khin Nyunt because the GOI did not view the replacement of Nyunt as an indication of "which way the dust would fall" on democracy. The GOI believes the coup was an "internal struggle," she said, speculating that the junta may be somewhat fragile. As evidence, Vashishta observed that Than Shwe traveled with the wives of two other powerful generals, Thura Shwe Man and Soe Win, who she mused may have been used as "hostages" to ensure tranquillity among the generals in Rangoon during Than Shwe's absence.

6. (C) Vashishta reiterated India's belief that only constructive engagement of the military regime could bring about any meaningful change, saying sanctions have only isolated Burma, and have not encouraged democratic reforms there. Burma is so isolated that members of Than Shwe's delegation wondered whether they would have to "go nuclear" to get US attention, she remarked, noting the comparison to Pakistan. She emphasized that if India also isolates Burma, no one will be able to engage Rangoon on democracy or other issues.

7. (C) Flagging that the timing of UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail's October 29-31 visit to New Delhi was not coincidental, Vashishta expressed India's desire to work with the UN on Burma. However, she argued that the organization "has lost credibility" in the eyes of developing countries and should at least make an attempt to be more "pro-Myanmar." The EU is too "obvious, shabby, shortsighted and full of contradictions" to play a meaningful role in Burma, she argued, while Thailand takes a pro-active approach to Rangoon only "because one of their ministers wants to be the next UN Secretary General."

Counter-Terrorism Agreement

---------------------------

8. (C) Billing the Memorandum of Understanding on "Non-Traditional Security Issues" as an agreement on counter terrorism "whatever they call it," Vashishta said the MOU outlines Rangoon's obligations to crack-down on anti-India militants operating out of Burmese territory. The GOI does not believe that Rangoon is fueling the insurgents to pressure New Delhi because "it is not in Burma's strategic interest," but New Delhi is growing increasingly concerned about insurgent activities in the border regions. The GOB agreed to move troops to the Indo-Burmese border "not because of their interests, but because some of India's interests are now tied up with theirs," Vashishta said, citing economic development as an example. She expressed optimism that Burma was taking India's request seriously, unlike in the past. She noted that Soe Win, Burma's new PM, had previously commanded forces along the border with India. PolCouns stressed our concerns about the safety and treatment of ASSK and the democratic opposition, given Soe Win's direct involvement in the May 30, 2003 attack on ASSK and her followers (ref A). Vashishta had different information, alleging that some of the opposition parties were hopeful about a near-term political opening.

No To Military Exercises, Yes To Grants

---------------------------------------

9. (C) Although the India-Burma joint statement on Than Shwe's visit mentions the "possibilities of expanding cooperation" in defense, Vashishta categorically stated that joint military exercises "are absolutely ruled out," saying this is "a big, firm no." She indicated the GOI could provide limited military equipment to Rangoon, "on par with what the rest of ASEAN provides," but is "very careful" when it comes to military cooperation with Burma. 10. (C) Vashishta confirmed plans to provide Burma with a USD 20 million dollar grant to be used for energy, gas, and upgrading refining facilities, and said the money would be used to entice Rangoon to reform. She explained that the junta would not receive the funds unless "they do certain things," saying that India hopes to "engage them (with the grant) and slowly lay down conditions for reform." She cast this as part of New Delhi's people-to-people strategy.

China

-----

11. (C) Expressing concern about Chinese influence in Burma, Vashishta said that the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has been "learning from the master about how to hoodwink the international community" on human rights. She said that China would like an Indian Ocean port and hopes to project its influence "everywhere India does." Vashishta argued that "what you hear about the PLA in Burma is only the tip of the iceberg," as US intelligence must know. Burmese engagement with India stems in part from Rangoon's belief that "China takes them for granted," she asserted.

Religion

--------

12. (C) Commenting on the delegation's visit to several important Buddhist shrines in India, Vashishta noted that over the last three years, Than Shwe had repeatedly requested a pilgrimage to the sites and speculated that the religious journey was a major factor behind the trip. She claimed that this pilgrimage was not just aimed a burnishing the junta's Buddhist credentials, but rather was related to Than Shwe's personal sense of mortality. But she added, the Burmese military did not think they had done anything wrong, and do not need to atone for their sins.

Comment

-------

13. (C) Led by Foreign Secretary Saran, a former Ambassador to Rangoon, the GOI has embarked on a major diplomatic initiative with Burma. India's policy toward the GOB is pragmatic, based largely on New Delhi's security interests, but also reflects the GOI's desire eventually to see a democratic Burma to its east. India has welcomed US input about how best to encourage democracy there, presenting an opportunity that we should seize upon to expand the US-India regional dialogue to include developments in Rangoon. MULFORD

India a 'raucous democracy' but 'true partner' of America


Thursday, 11 February 2010, 13:07
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000287
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, ECON, SENV, AF, PK, IN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL KERRY'S VISIT TO INDIA
Classified By: A/DCM Uzra Zeya. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).

Summary
In a wideranging brief before a visit by Senator John Kerry, US diplomats praise India's "raucous democracy" and Manmohan Singh's government and welcome new recognition of Indian responsibilites on climate change. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
1. (S) Summary: You will find an Indian government that is more committed than ever to building a durable and wide ranging USG-GOI relationship after Prime Minister Singh's Washington visit in November. New Delhi has been broadly supportive of USG goals in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. After refusing post-Mumbai to engage broadly with Pakistan until Islamabad took action against the attack perpetrators, New Delhi has now offered unconditional talks to Islamabad. This is a calculated risk on PM Singh's part given the political fallout over last summer's India-Pakistan joint statement at Sharm al Sheikh. On Afghanistan, there are underlying concerns that U.S. policy foreshadows an early exit from Afghanistan with negative security consequences for India. India has expressed concern about the outlines of the reintegration policy promoted by the Karzai government and supported by the United States. The GOI has begun to weigh a policy response that may include increased Afghan police and military training/assistance. They will be interested in your views on India's role in Afghanistan. Our bilateral Civil-Nuclear Agreement no longer dominates the headlines, but the goodwill it generated has contributed to our improved relationship across the board and to India's gradual movement toward the nonproliferation mainstream. Several Agreement implementation measures remain unresolved. The U.S.-India defense relationship is progressing rapidly, and defense sales could reach USD 4 billion in 2011. The U.S.-India economic relationship, for decades practically nonexistent, has grown quickly and U.S. exports to India have increased five-fold from USD 3.6 billion in 2000 to USD 17.7 billion last year. On climate change, the Copenhagen conference marked a fundamental shift in India's position, and India is beginning to understand it must address the climate issue not as a poor developing nation but rather as the major economy it has become. End Summary.

Pakistan

--------

2. (S) The Indians understand our message about the importance of resuming a robust dialogue with Pakistan and the necessity of increased GOI communication to reassure Pakistani officials about India's intentions in Afghanistan. India has now offered to hold Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan, but has rejected Islamabad's attempts to condition resumption of discussion on picking up the thread from the Composite Dialogue India paused after Mumbai.

3. (C) PM Singh is taking a calculated political risk in pushing forward with an offer of talks with Pakistan. While there is a general recognition that the policy of not engaging with Pakistan except on counterterrorism issues has exhausted its usefulness, that does not necessarily translate into strong or consistent support for broad talks with Pakistan among the political class, given continuing terrorist threats. There are heavyweights in the Congress, including Finance Minister Mukherjee, who were not supportive after last year's Sharm al Sheikh Joint Statement fiasco, and they will seize on any missteps to argue against a policy that reaches out to the Pakistanis. This is also likely to be the last time for some time that PM Singh will have sufficient support to reach out to re-engage on dialogue. The PM took a beating after Sharm al Sheikh and his government's post-election honeymoon came to a crashing halt. If this renewed effort falters because of lack of interest on the part of the Pakistanis, many could point to newly appointed NSA Shiv Shankar Menon as the scapegoat. Menon was lambasted for his role as Foreign Secretary at Sharm and will equally be identified with this proposal.

Afghanistan

-----------

4. (C) The reaction to the President's December 1 West Point speech announcing the way forward on Afghanistan drew guardedly positive support from most of our interlocutors. While the President's emphasis on development and agriculture assistance and a re-affirmation of USG commitment to the region drew approval, many were apprehensive about the setting of July 2011 as a beginning date for the transfer of U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. India's fears that its views and interests are not being taken into account has intensified lately: India was kept out of the Istanbul regional conference on Afghanistan (based on a Pakistani veto) and New Delhi was the odd man out at the London Conference over reintegration.

5. (U) India is proud of its own ongoing "development partnership" with post-Taliban Afghanistan that began in late 2001, and the GOI claims the sum of its performed and pledged assistance to date totals USD 1.3 billion. Civilian aid is channeled into three main areas: infrastructure development (centerpiece is a 218km road in Helmand); capacity building (scholarships and civil service training in India); and humanitarian assistance (daily food aid to 2 million Afghan school children). Virtually all GOI aid is administered through the Afghan government or NGOs.

6. (S) Indian support for Afghanistan's government is long-standing and motivated by a variety of reasons, not the least being Afghanistan's strategic value as New Delhi seeks regional influence. India, with the exception of the Taliban era, has always had strong ties to Afghanistan since Partition; conversely, Islamabad with the exception of the Taliban period, has had strained ties with Kabul. Pakistan's expectation that the government in Afghanistan will be pro-Pakistan and anti-Indian is unrealistic, particularly given Karzai's own long-standing ties to India and the goodwill that India's assistance and other elements of India's soft power have created in Afghanistan.

7. (S) While India's assistance to Afghanistan has primarily focused on reconstruction and stabilization, there has also been limited military aid. The MEA told us after the West Point speech that the GOI wishes to do more to help develop Afghan capacity, especially with regard to the police and military, but is also cognizant of USG "sensitivities" about such assistance. XXXXXXXXXXXX

Internal Politics: a Raucous Democracy

--------------------------------------

8. (SBU) We have a true partner in the current Indian government led by Prime Minister Singh, but its capabilities are not without limits. The strong performance by the Congress Party and its United Progressive Alliance (UPA) allies in India's national elections in 2009 gave the Prime Minister Singh's coalition a mandate to govern and -- freed from dependence on half-hearted allies on the Left -- to promote a closer relationship with the United States. Despite the strong endorsement by the electorate and a floundering opposition, the UPA government has gotten off the blocks somewhat slowly. The government grew less confident after its honeymoon period was cut short by the fallout over a joint statement from Singh's July 2009 Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani. The Sharm debacle rallied Singh's otherwise disjointed political opponents, while reminding the Prime Minister of his constraints despite his mandate. The tentativeness of the government was again on display during the winter session of Parliament, during which an unruly opposition united over populist causes and sidelined civil nuclear liability legislation and long-awaited financial sector liberalization. The government is again on the defensive over demands for the creation of a separate state of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh. On February 3 it bowed to political pressure and announced the formation of a five-person Committee to evaluate the issue.

Civil Nuclear Cooperation

-------------------------

9. (SBU) India viewed the signing of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as an historic event and an essential part of transforming our relationship. India has since followed through on its nonproliferation commitments by signing its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and concluding an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. We are working with the government to implement commercial cooperation, providing U.S. firms access to an estimated USD 150 billion market and leading to the creation of thousands of high-skilled jobs, as well as providing India's growing economy with access to clean energy. The Agreement no longer dominates the headlines, but the goodwill it generated has contributed to our improved relationship across the board and to India's gradual movement toward the nonproliferation mainstream.

10. (SBU) The Indian government made substantial progress on implementing commercial cooperation ahead of PM Singh's visit to Washington, though some important hurdles remain. In recent months, India announced two favorable reactor park sites for U.S. firms in the states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, and submitted its declaration of safeguarded facilities to the IAEA. We have held five rounds of reprocessing consultations pursuant to the 123 Agreement, and hope to conclude negotiations soon. The government responded to our request for Part 810 license assurances on the eve of Singh's visit, a top priority of U.S. industry, and we await clarification on two issues. The cabinet approved draft liability legislation, a top priority for U.S. firms, but Parliament was not able to pass the legislation in the just-concluded session.

The Defense Relationship

------------------------

11. (SBU) The U.S.-India defense relationship has progressed rapidly since sanctions were removed in 2000 following India's 1998 nuclear test. Today's relationship is focused on bilateral exercises, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), and personal exchanges at schools, conferences and seminars. Billion-dollar defense sales are a growing component and a superb opportunity to expand the relationship. Exercises are the most visible of the activities between our two militaries. In October, the Army completed its most ambitious exercise with the deployment of 17 Strykers to India for a two week exercise which included live firing of a combined mechanized task force for the first time. Simultaneously, the Air Force had five transport aircraft participating in exercise COPE INDIA held in Agra that included a Special Forces component. The Navy conducts an annual exercise, Malabar, that has been conducted both bilaterally and multilaterally. The Marines hold an annual exercise with the Indian Army, Shatrujeet, which focuses on amphibious operations. The Indians have been cooperating with the Joint POW/MIA Accountability Command for recovery of remains from downed Second World War planes in the politically sensitive state of Arunachal Pradesh. To date, we are still working on obtaining permission to repatriate all of the remains so as to properly identify and recover lost Airmen.

12. (SBU) Defense sales are growing quickly from roughly one billion USD in 2008, to over two billion so far this year. There is good potential for over four billion in sales next year, especially with the recent Ministry of Defense approval to pursue the C-17. For the first time, India can afford (politically and financially) to purchase front line U.S. equipment. They recognize the quality of U.S. systems and have been astounded by the mission capable rates quoted for U.S. aircraft compared to their older Russian inventory. They are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their analysis of costs and now use life-cycle cost instead of cost on delivery for some purchases, giving U.S. products an opportunity to beat cheaply made competitors. Most important, the July 2009 agreement on End Use Monitoring (EUM) has opened the door for FMS sales at a time when there is growing frustration with Russia - previously India's supplier of choice. The near doubling in cost and extensive delays in delivery of the ex-Russian aircraft carrier GORSHKOV, issues with transfer of technology on the T-90 tank, and universal problems with spare parts have convinced the GOI that new sources of supply are needed to balance Russia. Given an opportunity, we ask that you endorse Indian purchases of U.S. equipment as an important part of our defense relationship and support our ongoing sales efforts.

Economic Ties

-------------

13. (SBU) The U.S.-India economic relationship, for decades practically nonexistent, has grown rapidly and has significant potential to expand further. At the same time, India is an increasingly important player at the table in multilateral economic fora, from the WTO Doha Round negotiations and the G-20, World Bank and IMF to the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen. While India was seen in the United States as a spoiler when the World Trade Organization Doha Development Agenda talks broke down in July 2008, India's new Commerce Minister showed leadership and significantly improved the tone of discussions when he hosted a Doha "Mini-ministerial" meeting in September, attended by U.S. Trade Representative Kirk.

14. (U) The United States is India's largest trading partner in goods and services and one of its largest foreign investors. Investment has surged between our countries in recent years, prompting agreement to launch negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty. U.S. exports to India has increased five-fold from USD 3.6 billion in 2000 to USD 17.7 billion last year. Two-way merchandise trade grew to a record USD 44.4 billion in 2008, a 76-percent increase from 2005. Reflecting the global economic downturn, exports to India fell 9.7 percent in January-September 2009 (to USD 8 billion), but Indian exports to the United States fell more sharply. Thus, the U.S. trade deficit with India fell 43.8 percent to just USD 3.2 billion in January-September 2009. Despite the size of its economy, India was only the United States' 18th largest trading partner in 2008. One of the major goals of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum is to resolve barriers to trade and investment to improve this ranking.

15. (U) India was somewhat shielded from the global economic downturn due to its conservative central bank and SEC-equivalent restricting many of the derivative innovations linked to the global financial crisis, and its relatively low reliance on exports. However, although India's "Wall Street" was less affected, its "Main Street" bore the brunt of the downturn, with slower growth, tighter access to credit, declining exports, higher unemployment, and less investment. In response, India's central bank and SEC-equivalent relaxed many of its restrictions on foreign capital inflows and investment procedures and the GOI enacted several fiscal stimulus programs, both pre- and post-election, to boost economic growth.

16. (SBU) The Indian economy continues to be one of fastest growing economies in the world, even as the global slowdown and financial crunch moderated GDP growth from nine percent in fiscal year (FY) 2007-08 to 6.7 percent in FY 2008-09, which ended March 31. Growth in the second quarter was 7.9 percent and growth in fiscal year 2009-10 is now expected to be in the seven percent range. The Commerce Ministry announced December 15 that it expects to see a return to positive export growth soon. With the expected return of higher growth rates, rising inflation, and the highest fiscal deficit (approximately 11 percent of GDP) in 20 years, the GOI has begun to reverse some the measures it enacted during the financial crisis and has announced plans to decrease subsidies and increase disinvestment. Lagging agricultural productivity and poor -- but improving -- infrastructure continue to constrain growth. Accordingly, the top Indian economic priorities remain physical and human infrastructure development and spreading economic benefits into rural India.

17. (U) The United States continues to have concerns about agricultural trade with India. The recently released Senate Finance Committee Report on Indian agricultural trade barriers -- a U.S. ITC investigation -- highlighted the essentially defensive agricultural trade policy long promoted by the Indian government. The United States is particularly interested in gaining marketing access for U.S. dairy products which are blocked due to a series of non-scientific GOI rules. Discussions are ongoing, but the effort to resolve long-standing agricultural trade issues is a Mission priority.

Climate Change/Clean Energy

---------------------------

18. (SBU) The 16th Conference of Parties (COP-16) at Copenhagen marked a fundamental shift in India's climate change position. Minister of Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh claimed victory for India's negotiating team in a December 22 address to parliament stating India was "entirely successful" at COP-16 in that there was no dilution of either the Bali Action Plan or the Kyoto Protocol, India was not required to agree on a peak year for its emissions, and that it avoided any legally binding emission commitments, including a long-term global goal of reducing emissions 50 percent by 2050. Although India's current position is that the Kyoto Protocol and Bali Action Plan are sacrosanct and must be the basis for all future climate negotiations, both Ramesh and Prime Minister Singh have publicly supported the Copenhagen Accord pursuant to the Accord, India communicated its domestic mitigation action of reducing it's carbon intensity by 20 to 25 percent by 2020 from a 2005 baseline to the UNFCCC Secretariat on January 30. In addition, Ramesh has drawn India farther from the G77 by telling parliament India was not in the same category as other developing countries such as Bangladesh, Maldives, Grenada, or African nations, that it did not need to demand technology transfer at low or no cost, and that India should be selling green technology to the world. India's association and close coordination of its climate negotiating position with the Basic Group of nations, comprised of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, indicates India is beginning to understand it must address the climate issue not as a poor developing nation but rather as the major economy it has become.

19. (SBU) During the November visit of the Prime Minister, Secretary Clinton and her Idian counterpart signed an MOU to Enhance Cooperation on Energy Security, Energy Efficiency, Clean Energy and Climate Change. Both countries share an interest in rapid expansion of clean and renewable energy production. India has massive investments planned in energy production, both conventional and renewable, as the government recognizes the need to continue to power India's economic growth and extend access to electricity to ever more of the significant portion of the population which still does not have it. The bilateral MOU calls for stepped up engagement beyond the existing Energy Dialogues to include a focused Clean Energy Research and Deployment Initiative to rapidly disseminate clean energy technologies, including solar, wind, hydro, as well as shale gas and cleaner coal. The USG is holding ongoing inter-agency consultations and is finalizing recommendations for the organization of these new initiatives. DOE has the lead on a Joint Clean Energy Research Center, while USAID is heading a multi-agency team to create the Clean Energy Deployment Center in coordination with State, Commerce, OPIC, EXIM, USTDA and others. Completed designs for the centers are expected by early spring. We expect that they will accelerate existing initiatives as well as launch numerous others in order to have broad impact in building the Indian clean energy market. ROEMER

JIHADI BIO TERRORISM


DATED: Wednesday, 24 May 2006, 10:28
SENSITIVITY: S E C R E T


SUBJECT: EMBASSY AND MEA HOLD PRODUCTIVE, FOCUSED CTJWG
FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN DELHI
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3473 B. NEW DELHI 3057 C. 05 NEW DELHI 6596

Summary: The DCM and key Embassy interlocutors on counterterrorism issues (see Paras 21-22) on May 19 reviewed with MEA Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh action items that emerged from the April 19 US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) meeting in Washington and subsequent CT-related conversations (Refs A and B). The dialogue paved the way for further discussions on bio-terrorism cooperation, operationalizing countering terrorism finance, aviation security, improving USG delivery of CT training (and a GOI offer to provide CT training to USG personnel), improving the sharing of GOI tactical terrorist threat information, and continuing the discussion on how most effectively to counter extremist ideology in mass media and on the Internet. Ambassador Singh and Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat) Sharad Kumar also shared GOI concerns that India is becoming more central to al-Qai'da's agenda, and that al-Qa'ida and "al-Qa'ida franchises" share close links with the Pakistan establishment. The Indians again were receptive to the idea of a focused effort to defeat LTTE fund-raising and arms trafficking, but asked that this be couched in generic terms, rather than targeting Sri Lanka alone. End Summary.

India Now an al-Qa'ida Target

-----------------------------

3. (C) Singh opened by noting that India is becoming more prominent on al-Qai'da's radar, pointing to Ayman al-Zawahiri's April 29 video message praising "popular jihadist movements against Indians in Kashmir" and calling India "the best candidate for carrying out the Zionist-Crusader scheme to humiliate, weaken, and dismember Pakistan." He added that al-Zawahiri's recent reference to the US-India civil nuclear agreement demonstrated that Delhi's growing cooperation with Washington was drawing al-Qai'da's attention.

Alleging Direct Links Between al-Qa'ida and Islamabad

--------------------------------------------- --------

4. (S) Singh asserted that Pakistan's ISI retains connections to al-Qa'ida and has been privy to Usama bin Ladin's communications. To the DCM's question of information on operational links, Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat, i.e. RAW) Sharad Kumar stated that Indian intelligence has transcripts of pre-9/11 meetings between UBL and Mullah Omar during which terrorism in J&K was discussed. He continued that UBL had been "willing to divert $20 million" from Central Asian programming to support Kashmir-oriented

NEW DELHI 00003611 002 OF 008

terrorism, and that UBL was quoted saying the Kashmiri jihadis "would not run short of funds." Kumar added that when UBL sent his bodyguard contingent to help the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance, the temporary chief of his security force was an unnamed individual who went on to join Jaish-e-Mohammad. Singh ascribed al-Qa'ida's increasing interest in India to the July 18 civil nuclear agreement. "ISI seeks to heat things up" to interfere with growing US-India convergence, he claimed.

5. (S) RAW's Kumar observed that today, "al-Qa'ida franchises," if not al-Qa'ida proper, are and have been very active in India. He defined "al-Qa'ida franchises" as groups that espouse the same extremist ideology and share some logistical and funding infrastructure even while remaining discrete organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Not all these groups or their attacks are linked, he continued; each must be investigated individually to locate their intersections.

Delhi Interest in Bio-Terror Rising

-----------------------------------

6. (C) Turning to the subject of counter-bio-terrorism cooperation, Singh reported that Indian intelligence is picking up chatter indicating jihadi groups are interested in bio-terrorism, for example seeking out like-minded PhD's in biology and bio-technology. He compared the prospects for nuclear terrorism ("still in the realm of the imaginary") to bio-terrorism ("an ideal weapon for terrorism ... anthrax could pose a serious problem ...it is no longer an academic exercise for us.") and indicated conceptual support for a joint bio-terrorism exercise. Singh stated that the text of the 1997 HHS/Ministry of Health Joint Statement included provisions for modeling bio-terrorism attacks, which could be used as a mechanism to support a joint exercise. (NOTE: Embassy HHS Attache reviewed the 1997 and 2005 HHS/MoH agreements and found no such mention of modeling bio-terrorism. End Note.) He concluded that although other relevant Ministries "work at their own pace," MEA would confer with them to secure their buy-in. Embassy will pursue the matter with MEA and other GOI interlocutors with an eye to conducting a joint and multi-agency bio-terrorism tabletop exercise by late 2006.

Operationalizing Anti-Terrorism Finance

---------------------------------------

7. (C) Noting that both sides have identical interests in combating terrorist groups but no practical experience in joint operations with each other, the DCM revisited the suggestion to create a contact group of experts -- with the MEA as the hub but including the Indian Finance Ministry and the nascent Financial Intelligence Unit as well as the Embassy Economics Section -- to focus on squeezing LTTE finances (Refs A and B). The DCM and Singh agreed that to keep the operation out of the spotlight it could adopt an innocuous name such as the "Subgroup on Terror Finance."

NEW DELHI 00003611 003 OF 008

PolCouns underscored the importance of moving from exchanging data on terrorist finances to shutting down money flows, particularly in light of the LTTE's wealth (i.e. it's ability to fund both a navy and an air force) and its recent egregiously violent attacks. J/S Kumar was tasked to develop ideas about modalities of the group's operations; he observed that although a cooperative effort is the most effective way forward, "most of our people are cagey regarding cooperation and joint operations," and "do not even trust others in their own government"; however, he added, their buy-in will be required. The DCM reassured Kumar that these operations would be kept in secure channels and well away from the media. Please see Action Request in Para 17.

Aviation Security

-----------------

8. (C) Taking note of the increase in aviation links between the US and India under the Open Skies agreement, including twice-daily non-stop flights, the DCM requested an official briefing on the GOI's anti-hijacking policy (Ref C) -- specifically, a full briefing to relevant Embassy elements (RSO, ECON, POL, etc.) plus advice on how Embassy can best brief US airlines on how they are affected by the GOI policy. Singh agreed to arrange the briefing. RSO added that Continental particularly had asked the Civil Aviation Ministry for this information but was only informed of the existence of a policy (and not the elements of that policy). (NOTE: A GOI Civil Aviation representative was slated to brief the CTJWG but was unable to travel to Washington to attend the meeting. End Note.) Before turning to a broader review of CT training opportunities, RSO noted that, pending a June 1 approval deadline, a DS/ATA Airport Security Consultation is slated for June 26-30.

Making CT Training Smarter

--------------------------

9. (C) After RSO provided an update on ATA courses for India currently in the pipeline (Para 18), Singh passed to the DCM a GOI "wish-list" of ATA courses (Para 19) and a list of courses the GOI could offer to USG law enforcement/military officers (Para 20). RSO pointed out that the Airport Security Consultation could be used to bootstrap other related training, such as on travel document authentication.

10. (C) Moving forward, RSO asked for points of contact among GOI subject-matter experts to identify course objectives ahead of time, to allow USG training providers to modify courses (where possible) to meet GOI objectives. RSO noted the broad spectrum of USG elements that would benefit by having this information.

India "Can't Afford to Lag Behind" on Bio-Metrics

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11. (C) Singh raised the issue of bio-metrics cooperation, in which the GOI "can't afford to lag behind," he said. The

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MEA's Consular/Passports/Visas Division coordinates with the Home Ministry in this area. He underlined the role of document authentication in disrupting terrorist (and other illicit) travel and the transit of weapons and other contraband shipments. Singh and the DCM agreed on the importance of harmonizing document standards. The DCM reminded Singh that one problem the USG has in repatriating Indian nationals is the difficulty in verifying their identities; the Embassy's Consular Section works with the Home Ministry but bio-metrics may offer a solution.

Streamlining Flow of Tactical Threat Information

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12. (C) The DCM underlined the importance of the Embassy (through the RSO) being able promptly to inform US businesses with equities in India of "the ground truth" on terrorist threat information and terrorist attacks, including hoaxes. Stories periodically appear in the Indian press that sensationalize alleged threats against American interests. While these stories are often based on faulty information, they do serve to increase security concerns in the American corporate community in particular. The DCM explained the USG "No Double Standard" and offered that GOI sources and methods could still be protected under that policy. When Singh asked how such incidents are handled in Washington, RSO informed him the DS Protective Liaison Division keeps close contact with the diplomatic community. One DS Agent typically services several diplomatic missions -- and is able to share tactical terrorist threat information on a real-time basis. Singh concurred that such a service in India is necessary beyond what state police agencies may provide, and suggested the MEA, with inputs from the state police and Home Ministry, would be the likely information provider. The DCM then explained the function of the Embassy's EAC to evaluate imminent threat information and decide on an appropriate response, indicating how reliable real-time GOI terrorist threat information would fit into the Embassy's decision-making process. Singh agreed in principle to create a real-time response mechanism to disseminate GOI terrorist threat information, with RSO as the Embassy's POC. He saw this as important both to the diplomatic community and India's growing pool of expatriate businesses.

"No Complaints" on Intel Sharing

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13. (S) Singh reported that there were "no complaints" from Delhi on US-India intelligence sharing overall, and introduced J/S Kumar as a key contact for intel sharing. The DCM concurred n the positive state of intelligence cooperation. He conveyed his understanding that earlier US concerns in this area have largely been resolved.

Continuing the Ideological Discussion

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14. (S) The DCM and Singh revisited the CTJWG discussion on

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combating extremist ideology particularly through the Internet without leaving a USG fingerprint. They agreed to schedule separate meetings to pursue this issue and explore how much can be accomplished and how best to do so.

Future Meetings Planned

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15. (C) In addition to issue-specific Embassy-GOI meetings to be held over the summer, Singh said that he planned to meet S/CT Ambassador Crumpton in September on the fringes of the UNGA. The DCM noted that Undersecretary Nick Burns plans to visit India in late summer, which would offer an interim opportunity to review CT progress, among other issues.

Comment: Encouraging Signs Continue

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16. (C) We are encouraged by the MEA's continued receptivity to engage with us more deeply than in recent history on CT issues. Barriers appear to be dissolving even regarding very sensitive issues, such as intelligence sharing and bio-terrorism preparedness. As far as the US-India CT dialogue is concerned, Ambassador Singh embodies the adage that "the right man in the right place at the right time can turn the tide." He has yet to ensure the other actionable parts of the Indian bureaucracy march in the same direction and to the same tune, but it is clear he is serious about making practical CT cooperation work and serious about working with us to do so.

Action Request for SCA and S/CT

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17. (C) Given the GOI's expressed interest in "doing more" on the LTTE (Refs A and B and Para 7), Embassy requests further guidance from SCA and S/CT on moving in coordination with Delhi against LTTE finances and arms flows. We expect also to be queried about what steps the USG is prepared to take against LTTE fund-raising in the US.

ATA Courses In Train for India 2006

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18. (SBU) Begin list of ATA courses for India 2006:

-- ATA-5345 Executive Course on Cyber-Terrorism Duration: June 12-14 Location: Hyderabad Status: Offer accepted

-- ATA-2994 Post-Blast Investigation Duration: July 17-August 4 Location: Baton Rouge Status: Offer accepted

-- ATA-5062 India Senior Crisis Management Course Duration: August 21-26

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Location: Washington Status: Pending GOI approval

-- ATA-5956 Airport Security Consultation Duration: June 26-30 Location: New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Jaipur Status: Requested by the GOI. Pending formal approval

-- ATA-5737 India VIP Protection Course Duration: August 7-25 Location: Baton Rouge Status: Pending GOI approval

GOI "Wish List" for CT Courses

---------------------------------

19. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document "ATA Training Courses - Requirements of Indian Police:

Methodology and equipment for countering suicide bombing and fidayeen attacks.

Countermeasures against improvised explosive devices and land mines used against transport vehicles

Terrorist communications systems

Channels of terrorist financing - Modus Operandi and countermeasures

Building personal profile of terrorists/criminals: How to build the profile (including modus operandi) of terrorists and criminals associated with organized crime

Database development: -- What databases are available to investigators in the US? -- How have these databases been built/developed? -- What are the laws associated with the creation and access to these databases?

Experience Sharing: The most valuable input to agencies charged with the task of maintaining security is the experience of other such agencies. At the moment US security forces are dealing with "rural" militancy in Afghanistan and "urban" militancy in Iraq. It is not necessary to send a large number of officers from India. US officers with appropriate experience could come to India for 2-3 day sessions with Indian officers. This idea is an extension of the cooperation between the defense forces of the two countries. We would thus suggest the following:

Experience Sharing/Afghanistan: -- What were the problems faced in Afghanistan at the strategic level; at the tactical level? -- What strategies evolved to resolve the problems? -- How successful were the strategies and what were/are the problems faced in implementing the strategies? -- What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the

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security forces? -- In retrospect, what else could have been done?

Experience Sharing/Iraq: -- What were the problems faced in Iraq at the strategic level; at the tactical level? -- What strategies evolved to resolve the problems? -- How successful were the strategies and what were/are the problems faced in implementing the strategies? -- What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the security forces? -- In retrospect, what else could have been done?

General policing as related to terrorism: -- Forged documentation and travel documents -- Money counterfeiting -- Money laundering

Security Management: -- Airport security -- VIP protection

Intelligence gathering techniques including practical demonstration of the techniques

Illegal immigration management including border patrolling techniques

Forensics medicine: new methodology and tools available to assist investigations

Forensic science: -- DNA fingerprinting -- Other special techniques such as use of polygraph -- Use of voice prints and other biometric measures

End Text.

GOI Offer of CT Courses for USG Personnel

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20. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document "Counterterrorism Courses for US Forces Personnel in India":

-- Money Laundering at CBI Academy, Ghaziabad

-- Counter-Insurgency and Commando Course at Border Security Forces Training Center & School, Hazaribagh.

-- Weapons & Tactics Course at Central School of Weapons and Tactics, BSF Training Center & School, Indore.

-- Bomb Disposal Course at NSG Training Center, Manesar. (NOTE: NSG is the National Security Group, whose mandate includes VIP protection and response to major acts of terrorism occurring at diplomatic and GOI facilities. End Note.)

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-- Young Officer-Leg. II (Integrated) Course at BSF Academy, Tekanpur

-- Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare Course at Assam Rifles Training Center & School, Dimphu (Nagaland)

-- Training at Greyhounds Regional Training Center, Hyderabad (NOTE: The Greyhounds is a GOI security force targeting India's Naxalites/Maoists. End Note.)

End Text.

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